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ABSTRACT
YOUR TEACHER SAID WHAT ON FACEBOOK? APPLICATION OF FIRST
AMENDMENT SPEECH RIGHTS TO TEACHER CYBER SPEECH
Anthony M. Scarsella, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Jon Crawford, Director

There have been many recent instances of teachers being disciplined or terminated due to
their activity on social networking sites. School administrators will likely be confronted with a
growing number of reports of alleged inappropriate online teacher speech and required to make
determinations regarding disciplinary action. This study researched the relevant history of
judicial application of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment free speech rights for public
employees; investigated how the Supreme Court applied, modified and refined the judicial test
outlined in Pickering v. Board of Educ. in public employee free speech cases and; examined how
the United States federal Circuit Courts of Appeals applied Pickering and its progeny to public
employee speech cases. The study concludes by providing public school administrators with a
framework for investigating alleged inappropriate teacher cyber speech. This framework is
designed to assist public school administrators in asking pertinent questions that will eventually
aid school board attorneys in examining whether the alleged inappropriate teacher cyber speech
in question is protected by the First Amendment.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background
In today’s electronic age public school teachers are being disciplined or terminated for
their online activity on social networking sites.1 For example, a special education teacher in the
Torrance Unified School District was recently placed on administrative leave pending an
investigation for a Facebook posting that included derogatory comments about one of her
students and insulting statements about the student’s parents.2 The teacher wrote, “Well I have
an annual IEP [Individualized Education Plan] this morning with lawyers and crazy parents. The
student is a hot mess but so sweet! So after work I’m hitting happy hour at least I have
something to look forward too!!! Deep breath… I’m going in.”3 In June 2014, a music teacher
was fired by Akron Public Schools for posting racist and derogatory comments on Facebook. 4
On Halloween night, the teacher posted,
I don’t mind if you come to my neighborhood from the ghetto to trick-or-treat.
But when you whip out your teeny dicks and piss on the telephone pole in front of
my front yard and a bunch of preschoolers and toddlers, you can take your nigger1

Emily H. Fuller, supra note 1 at 1. Citing Ian Shapira, When Young Teachers Go Wild on the
Web, Public Profiles Raise Questions of Propriety and Privacy, (April 28, 2008),
http://www.wasingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/27/AR2008042702213.html/.
2
Rob Kuznia, Facebook post lands Torrance special-education teacher in hot water, (Dec. 12,
2013), http://www.dailybreeze.com/social-affairs/20131212/facebook-post-lands-torrancespecial-education-teacher-in-hot-water/.
3
Id.
4
Jessica Dabrowski, Akron teacher fired over racially insensitive post, (June 17, 2014),
http://fox8.com/2014/06/17/akron-teacher-fired-over-racially-insensitive-post/.
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ass back where it came from. I don’t have anything against anyone of any color,
but niggers, stay out!5
In 2011, a first grade teacher in Paterson, New Jersey, was fired for two posts on her
Facebook page.6 The teacher wrote, “I’m not a teacher – I’m a warden for future
criminals!” and “They had a scared straight program in school – why couldn’t [I] bring
[first] graders?”7 The tenured teacher was afforded a hearing in front of an administrative
law judge (“ALG”) who ruled in favor of the school district.8 The ALG recommended
termination stating “the district’s need to operate efficiently trumped any free speech
rights because ‘thoughtless words can destroy the partnership between home and school
that is essential to the mission of the schools.’”9
Teacher use of social media continues to make news headlines as a growing
number of public school teachers are dismissed for posting comments, deemed
inappropriate by school officials, on social media sites.10 The growing popularity of
social media websites like Facebook, “has engendered a prurient interest in teachers’
‘private’ lives by both school administrators and the media.”11 According to the National
5

Id.
Dan Ivers, Court upholds firing of Paterson teacher who called students ‘future criminals’,
(January 11, 2013),
http://blog.nj.com/bergen_impact/print.html?entry=/2013/01/court_upholds_firing_of_paterson_t
eacher_who_called_students_future_criminals.html/.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Michael Stafford, No 1st Amendment Protection for Teacher’s Facebook Posts, (November 11,
2011), http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/2011/11/no-1st-amendment-protection-forteachers-facebook-posts.html/.
10
Molly DiBianca, Social Media Woes for School Districts, (December 16, 2011),
http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/2011/12/social-media-woes-for-schooldistricts.html/.
11
Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares, (retrieved October 18, 2014),
http://www.nea.org/home/38324.html/.
6
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Education Association (“NEA”), “Newspapers across the country have begun trolling
social networking sites for embarrassing and titillating postings by local teachers.”12 In
the past, public school teachers may have privately communicated their personal
disapproval of certain school policies, dislike for their students, or shared a story about a
drunken night out.13 However, today’s technology allows teachers to share, “the same
information and feelings that formerly they privately expressed… to a large group of
family, friends, and acquaintances” through electronic posts.14 In today’s technology
infused world, many teachers do not recognize the line between their personal lives and
professional lives is not black and white.15 This problem may only grow as an increasing
number of millennials (defined as persons born between 1982 and 2002) enter the
teaching profession.16 These young teachers have used Facebook for years and consider
it part of their daily lives.17 The NEA has observed some young teachers, “seem
oblivious to the devastating consequences of posting really stupid things in
cyberspace.”18
The NEA believes many teachers think they have an absolute First Amendment
right to post anything they want on social networking sites.19 Young non-tenured
teachers are in most danger of being fired for inappropriate social media postings because
12

Id.
Rachel A. Miller, Non-Symposium Student Piece: Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or
Not?, 2011 BYU Educ. & L.J. 637, 651 (2011).
14
Id.
15
Heather L. Carter, Teresa S. Foulger and Ann Dutton Ewbank, Have You Googled Your
Teacher Lately? Teacher’s Use of Social Networking Sites, Phi Delta Kappan 681 (May 2008).
16
Id.
17
Rachel A. Miller, supra note 13.
18
Mike Simpson, supra note 11.
19
Id.
13
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school officials may non-renew their employment without an accompanying substantial
justification whereas, “tenured teachers, by contrast, have far greater job security than
probationary teachers and don’t need to rely on the First Amendment for protection.”20
Online social networking is, “an uncharted landscape where legal systems have not yet
established a precedent about how educational institutions should deal with the ideal of
social networking, especially during what could be considered off-duty participation in
online spaces.”21 Case law on teacher cyber speech is only now emerging as more and
more teachers find themselves proverbial “hot water” by posting inappropriate comments
on social networking sites.22 This makes it difficult for school administrators to decide if
and when a teacher can be dismissed for alleged inappropriate cyberspace postings.
Disagreement in the judicial system over public employees’ First Amendment speech
rights only muddies the water for public school administrators.
For public school administrators, determining whether a public school teacher’s
speech (including cyber speech) is protected by the First Amendment is no easy task.
The Supreme Court outlined the required legal test to determine public employee First
Amendment speech protections through a series of cases, most notably, Pickering v.
Board of Educ., Connick v. Myers and Garcetti v. Ceballos.23 In Pickering, the Court
established a balancing test that weighted the interest of a public employee in exercising
his freedom of speech against the public employer’s interest in maintaining the efficient
20

Mike Simpson, supra note 11.
Teresa S. Foulger, Ann Dutton Ewbank, Adam Kay, Sharon Osborn Popp and Heather Lynn
Carter, supra note 15.
22
Rachel A. Miller, supra note 13.
23
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
21
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provision of public services.24 In Connick, the Court clarified the application of the
balancing test by requiring courts to first consider as a threshold inquiry whether a public
employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern before applying Pickering’s
balancing test..25 The Supreme Court’s most recent public employee speech decision in
Garcetti established a new threshold inquiry for courts in deciding public employee
speech cases. Garcetti required courts to first determine whether a public employee was
speaking as a public employee or as a private citizen, before determining whether the
speech in question was on a matter of public concern.26 If courts determined a public
employee was not speaking as a private citizen or if the public employee’s speech did not
touch on a matter of public concern, the Pickering balancing test was not to be applied as
a result of the Garcetti decision.
As a result of these cases, school administrators must analyze the following when
attempting to determine if a teacher has engaged in protected speech, including cyber
speech:
1. Was the teacher speaking as a private citizen or as a public employee pursuant
to their official duties;
2. Did the teacher’s speech address a matter of public concern; and
3. If the teacher was speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public concern;
does the school district’s interest in maintaining the efficient provision of
public services outweigh the teacher’s in exercising his freedom of speech?

24

Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
26
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
25
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It is reasonable to believe, however, that given the same set of facts and circumstances
different public school administrators may draw different conclusions in answering the
questions above. As the circuit court decisions discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrate, even
the federal appellate courts are split on how to best answer these questions and none of
the cases at the federal appellate level deal specifically with cyber speech.
One widely cited case dealing with public employee cyber speech at the federal
district level is Spanierman v. Hughes.27 In Spanierman, the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut ruled a school district did not violate a teacher’s First
Amendment speech rights when school district officials non-renewed the teacher for what
was deemed unprofessional interactions with students through the teacher’s MySpace
page.28 Jeffery Spanierman was an English teacher at Emmett O’Brien High School in
Ansonia, Connecticut.29 During that time, another teacher at the high school, Elizabeth
Michaud, received complaints from students regarding Spanierman’s personal MySpace
page.30 Michaud investigated Spanierman’s page and discovered pictures of naked men
and what she alleged were inappropriate “peer-to-peer like” conversations between
Spanierman and some of his students.31 The school district determined Spanierman had
“exercised poor judgment as a teacher” and notified him his contract would not be
renewed for the following school year.32

27

Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id.
29
Id. at 297.
30
Id. at 298.
31
Id. at 297.
32
Id.
28
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Spanierman sued the school district in part for violating his First Amendment free
speech rights. Applying the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti test outlined above, the district
court found Spanierman met the threshold requirement in Garcetti concluding he spoke
as a private citizen and not as a public employee when corresponding on his MySpace
page.33 Turning to the question of whether the speech touched on a matter of public
concern, the district court found, “the majority of the profile page consisted of personal
conversations between the Plaintiff and other MySpace users or creative writing,” expect
for a political poem regarding the Iraq War.34 The district court found, however,
Spanierman failed to establish a causal connection between his non-renewal and the
political poem. The district court also concluded regardless of the lack of causal
connection between the poem and his non-renewal, if the Pickering balancing test was
applied, Spanierman’s speech “was likely to disrupt school activities, and the likely
disruption was sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment value of [his] speech.”35

Problem Statement

The application of First Amendment rights to public employee cyber speech is an
emerging area of law and most school administrators are ill prepared to deal with cyber
speech issues involving teachers. It is important for school administrators to understand
the legal issues surrounding public employee First Amendment speech rights and

33

Id. at 309.
Id.
35
Id. at 312.
34
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carefully consider the specific set of circumstances of each case prior to disciplining
teachers for alleged inappropriate cyber speech.

Research Questions

This study investigated the following research questions:
1. What is the relevant history of judicial application of the U.S. Constitution’s First
Amendment free speech rights for public employees, including public school
teachers?36
2. How has the Supreme Court applied, modified and/or refined the balancing test
outlined in Pickering v. Board of Educ.?
3. How have the United States federal Circuit Courts of Appeals applied Pickering
and its progeny to public employee speech cases?
4. Based upon the review of the legal literature, Supreme Court decisions and United
States federal Circuit Courts of Appeals decisions, what questions should
administrators ask before they consult with the school district’s attorney?

Procedures

Standard legal research methodology will be used in this study. This
methodology includes paying particular attention to the language the courts use in
36

“Public school teachers” and “public employees” are used synonymously throughout this
study.

9

deciding public employee speech cases; reviewing the historic background of public
employee speech case law as addressed in legal reviews and scholarly publications;
analyzing the ways in which public employee speech cases have been interpreted in
subsequent case law and legal reviews; and examining major public employee speech
cases and arguments presented by the Supreme Court and the United States Courts of
Appeals in crafting their decisions. The literature review of cases is arranged in
chronological order of Supreme Court decisions and chronological order of Courts of
Appeals decisions.

Significance of the Study

There have been many recent instances of teachers being disciplined or
terminated due to their activity on social networking sites.37 A 2009 study of pre-service
teachers found 88% had a social networking website account.38 A 2010 survey
conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Pew Internet & American Life Project found,
“tech experts generally believe that today’s tech savvy young people – the ‘digital
natives’ who are known for enthusiastically embracing social networking – will retain
their willingness to share personal information online even as they get older and take on
more responsibilities.”39 These trends indicate young public school teachers entering the
workforce are more likely to embrace social networking and more willing to share
37

Emily H. Fuller, supra note 1. Citing Ian Shapira, When Young Teachers Go Wild on the Web,
Public Profiles Raise Questions of Propriety and Privacy, (April 28, 2008),
http://www.wasingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/27/AR2008042702213.html/.
38
Emily H. Fuller, supra note 1.
39
http://www.pewInternet.org/topics/Future-of-the-Internet.aspx//.
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personal information online than the previous generation of teachers. At the same time,
curiosity about teachers’ private lives has led students and parents to search online about
teachers.40 As a result, school administrators will likely be confronted with a growing
number of reports of alleged inappropriate online teacher speech and required to make
determinations regarding disciplinary action. Therefore, it is critical that school
administrators understand the current legal issues surrounding public employee speech
rights so they understand the need to be extremely careful when disciplining a public
school teacher for their online speech.

Delimitations

This study was designed to analyze court decisions regarding public employee
First Amendment speech rights. A delimitation of this study is that only federal,
appellate-level case law was considered. Case law on public employee cyber speech
rights is an emerging sector of the law. The majority of suits brought by teachers for
alleged violations of their First Amendment speech rights dealing specifically with cyber
speech have been or are in the process of being adjudicated in federal court system.
Limitations

Litigation is an expensive proposition for most school districts and it is likely
many disputes over disciplinary action taken by school districts against teachers for
alleged inappropriate cyber speech are settled outside of court. Because many of these
40

Heather L. Carter, Teresa S. Foulger and Ann Dutton Ewbank, supra note 15.
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settlement agreements contain confidentiality clauses, it is not possible to know how
many of these situations exist and how courts would have ruled had the cases gone to
trial.

12

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Public employees’ First Amendment free speech rights have evolved over time since
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote in an 1892 Massachusetts Supreme Court
decision, “The petitioner (a police officer) may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”41 This literature review examines a series of
Supreme Court decisions that have defined and redefined the free speech rights of public
employees. As public employees, each Court decision has impacted public school teachers.
This review focuses on Supreme Court decisions pre- and post- Pickering v. Board of Educ., the
seminal 1968 Court decision that reversed the Holmesian view of public employment as
privilege.42 Pickering laid out a test for balancing public employee free speech rights against
interests of public employers in maintaining their efficient provision of public services.43

Pre-1960’s

Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1968 Pickering decision, public employees were routinely
denied First Amendment speech protections in the workplace. Courts consistently upheld the

41

McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892).
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
43
Id.
42
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notion that public sector employment was a privilege and public employers had the right to
impose conditions upon employment without regard for constitutional protections otherwise
afforded private citizens.44 In deciding public employee speech cases prior to the 1960’s, courts
relied heavily on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ 1892 decision in McAuliffe V.
Mayor of New Bedford.45 In McAuliffe, petitioner John J. McAuliffe was removed from his
position as a policeman with the City of New Bedford by the city’s mayor for violating Rule
31of police regulations that prohibited members of the police department from soliciting money
or any aid for any political purpose and for being a member of a political committee.46 It was
alleged McAuliffe had engaged in political canvassing at two elections in the previous year and
solicited votes, aid and assistance from voters in the interests of certain political parties and
candidates for political office. It was alleged McAuliffe took part in these activities while off
duty. Upon his removal, McAuliffe appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to
overturn the mayor’s decision to remove him from his position as a policeman on the grounds
that the mayor lacked the authority to remove him for any cause other than an act of bad
behavior and the acts. McAuliffe argued his conduct was not tantamount to bad behavior.47 The

44

Stevan C. Dittman, Constitutional Law – Supreme Court Restricts First Amendment Rights of
Public Employees – Connick v. Myers, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 831, 832 (1984).
45
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892).
46
Id. McAuliffe was charged with violating Rule 31 of the police regulations of the city
specifically for engaging in political canvassing, soliciting votes and seeking aid and assistance
from voters. McAuliffe was afforded a hearing prior to his removal.
47
Id. McAuliffe specifically asked the local judge to rule that he could be removed only for an
act of bad behavior; that the hearing he was afforded should have been before the committee on
police; that he did not receive due hearing; that the notice of the hearing and the complaint was
irregular and insufficient law; that it was a question of law for the court to determine whether the
acts found by the mayor to have been committed by the petitioner amounted to bad behavior or
to soliciting aid within the meaning of Rule 31; and that the act so found did not constitute bad
behavior and was not in violation of the rule.

14

local judge denied McAuliffe’s petition finding the mayor had sufficient cause to remove
McAuliffe from his position.
After his petition was denied by the local judge, McAuliffe petitioned the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts for a writ of mandamus asking the court to overturn the lower
court’s affirmation of the termination of his employment. McAuliffe argued his removal
violated his First Amendment rights in that it infringed upon his right to express his political
opinions.48 Writing for the majority, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote, “The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”49 The court further stated government employers could “impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control” and therefore a government employee “takes
the employment on the terms which are offered.”50 According to the court, anyone wishing to
benefit from the privilege of public employment could do so only by accepting the conditions of
employment placed upon him or her by his or her employer even if the restrictions infringed
upon rights the employee would otherwise enjoy as a private citizen. The court’s reasoning in
McAuliffe would be widely cited in court decisions for the next sixty years, upholding the right
of public employers to discipline or terminate their employees for their expressive activities.51
In its 1952 decision in Adler v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court again ruled public
employers had the legal authority to limit the constitutional speech rights of public employees
the employees would otherwise enjoy as private citizens.52 The Court continued to rely upon
48

Id.
Id.
50
Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Employees, 2010
B.Y.U.L. Rev. 2117, 2121 (2010).
51
Mary-Rose Papandrea, supra note 50.
52
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
49
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Holmes’ McAuliffe decision to frame public employment as a privilege. In Adler, the Court
upheld a New York state law that provided for the disqualification and removal of
superintendents of schools, teachers, and employees of public schools in any city or school
district in New York who advocated for the overthrow of the government by unlawful means or
who were members of organizations that had a like purpose.53 The case was brought to the
Supreme Court on appeal by a group of public school teachers who had been dismissed from
their positions for refusing to answer whether or not they were members of the Communist Party.
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Minton acknowledged it was clear public school teachers
had the right to assemble, speak, think and believe as they pleased but it was, “equally clear that
they have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own terms.”54 The Court
further held dismissal from public employment for membership in an organization advocating for
the overthrow of the government did not result in the denial of an individual’s right to free
speech and assembly. Expressing this view Justice Minton wrote, “His freedom of choice
between membership in the organization and employment in the school system might be limited,
but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent
in every choice.55 The Court’s decision in Adler was one of the last decisions prior to Pickering
53

Id. at 490. During the “Red Scare” when paranoia of communist infiltration was rampant
across the country, the State of New York passed the Feinberg Law in 1949. The law allowed
the state’s Board of Regents, which governs public school districts in that state, to compile a list
of organizations deemed subversive and to disqualify members of such groups from teaching in
the state’s public schools. See N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 360.
54
Id. at 492. The Court relied on its previous ruling in United Public Workers v. Mitchell in
support of their opinion that public employers could restrict constitutional rights as a condition of
employment, including First Amendment rights of speech and assembly. In Mitchell, the Court
concluded that, “no rights guaranteed by the Constitution are absolute, and that all rights ‘are
subject to the elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights to others
would be a mockery.” See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1947).
55
Id. at 493.
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in which the Court invoked Justice Holmes’ view of public employment as a privilege and
upheld the right of public employers to restrict their employees’ First Amendment speech
protections as a condition of continued employment.

1960’s

The 1960’s brought the reversal of the Court’s Adler decision, the rejection of Justice
Holmes’ view of public employment as a privilege and the expansion of free speech rights for
public employees. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, faculty members at the State University of
New York at Buffalo sought review by the Court of a decision from the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York upholding the constitutionality of New York’s
teacher loyalty laws and administrative regulations that required faculty members of the State
University system to sign a certificate stating they were not a Communist, and if they had ever
been a Communist, they had communicated that fact to the President of the State University of
New York.56 The faculty members had refused to sign the certification and were dismissed from
their positions. In reversing the Court’s previous Adler decision, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority reasoned, “constitutional doctrine which has emerged since that decision has rejected its
major premise… that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned
upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government
action.”57 Citing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ earlier decision in this case, Brennan
reaffirmed “the theory that public employment…may be subjected to any conditions, regardless
56
57

Keyishian v. Board of regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592 (1967).
Id. at 605.
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of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”58 As a result of the Court’s Keyishan
decision, public employees could no longer arbitrarily restrict public employees’ First
Amendment constitutional protections as a condition of employment.
The Keyishian decision was followed by the Court’s landmark 1968 decision in Pickering
v. Board of Educ.59 In 1967, Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor
of the local newspaper criticizing the Board of Education’s management of school district
finances. Pickering was critical of the Board’s handling of a 1961 bond issuance that generated
proceeds used to build two new high schools as well as the Board’s subsequent attempts to pass a
referendum to increase the district’s property tax rate. Pickering was most critical of athletic
spending and accused the superintendent of suppressing faculty opposition to the proposed
referendum. In response to his letter, the Board of Education dismissed Pickering, charging that
numerous statements in the letter were false and, “unjustifiably impugned the ‘motives, honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence’ of both the Board and the school
administration.”60 The Board further charged the false statements would be “disruptive of faculty
discipline, and would tend to foment ‘controversy, conflict and dissension’ among teachers,
administrators, the Board of Education, and the residents of the district.”61 Pickering brought
suit in the Circuit Court of Will County challenging his terminate. He argued his statements
contained in the letter were protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Circuit
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Court affirmed the Board’s decision to terminate Pickering. Claiming a constitutional question
was involved in the case, Pickering appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois. The
Illinois high court upheld the termination on the grounds the statements were “detrimental to the
interests of the school system” and the interests of the Board of Education’s interest in operating
the school district efficiently overrode Pickering’s First Amendment speech rights.62
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the lower courts.
In overturning the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, Justice Marshall, writing the majority,
stated,
to the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work,
it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior
decisions of the Court.63
The Court stated “free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate,”
and, “teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and
definite opinions” regarding school matters and should be “able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”64 While the Court acknowledged Pickering had
the right to speak out about matters of public concern, its decision did not ban outright the ability
of public employers to restrict their employees’ speech.65 Rather, the Court created a test to
strike a, “balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, an as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
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public services it performs through its employees.”66 The Court concluded Pickering’s “exercise
of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal
from public employment.”67
In Pickering, the Court laid out a two-part test. The test’s first prong determined whether
or not the speech in question addressed a matter of public concern. The second prong weighted
the interest of the public employee in exercising his freedom of speech against the employer’s
interest in maintaining the efficient provision of public services. Applying this two-part test, the
Court first considered whether Pickering’s speech addressed a matter of public concern. The
Court held “the question whether a school system requires additional funds is a matter of
legitimate public concern.”68 Additionally, the Court observed Pickering’s accusations against
the Board reflected “a difference of opinion that clearly concerns an issue of general public
interest.69 After determining Pickering was speaking on a matter of public concern, the Court
turned to the second part of the balancing test: determining whether or not Pickering’s comments
jeopardized his relationships with his immediate supervisors or harmony with co-workers;
impeded his ability to perform his teaching duties; or interfered with the efficient operation of
the school district. In regards to Pickering’s relationship with his supervisors, the Court found
his relationship with the Board and the superintendent was “not the kind of close working
relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary to their proper functions.”70 The Court also rejected the Board’s argument that
Pickering’s comments would, “foment controversy and conflict among the Board, teachers,
66
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administrators, and the residents of the district,” noting his letter was greeted by most readers
with “massive apathy and disbelief.”71 Lastly, turning to the question of whether Pickering’s
statements impeded his ability to teach or interfered with the efficient operation of the school
district, the Court concluded the statements, “neither show[ed] nor [could] be presumed to have
in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom
or… interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.”72
The Pickering decision forged a balancing test to determine whether the interests of the
public employee in exercising his freedom of speech on matters of public concern outweighed
the interest of the employer in maintaining the efficient provision of public services. The Court’s
intent was to provide a broad framework for deciding cases in which public employees claimed
infringement of their free speech rights. In writing for the Court, Justice Marshall
acknowledged, “because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or
feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be
judged.”73 Rather, the Pickering balancing test “established some factors to consider in
determining whether the balanced should be tipped in favor of the rights of the employee or
toward the interest of the employer.”74
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The first factor was the proximity of the relationship between the employee and the
employer.75 Here, the Court concluded the relationship between Pickering and his superiors was
not sufficiently close to warrant disciplinary action. In a footnote, Justice Marshall
acknowledged that in some instances, “the relationship between superior and subordinate is of
such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public criticism of the superior by the
subordinate would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between
them can also be imagined.”76 The second factor considered by the Court, “concerned the extent
to which the employer had been harmed or was unable to continue to carry out its function.”77
Here, the Court concluded Pickering’s statements could not “reasonably be regarded as per se
detrimental to the district’s schools.”78 The third factor considered was the degree to which the
ideas expressed by a public employee constituted a matter of public concern.79 In considering
this factor, “the Court held that where the issue [was] one which is in the public interest and
addresses concerns which the electorate may harbor, ‘it is essential that [public employees] be
able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal.’”80 By
examining these factors, the Pickering Court, “laid the groundwork for determining what factors
should be considered in upholding a public employee’s right to free speech on matters of public
concern.”81
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1970’s

During the 1970’s, the Court refined and expanded the Pickering balancing test with
decisions in Perry v. Sindermann (1972), Mt. Healthy v. Doyle (1977) and Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District (1979). In Sindermann, the Court ruled the Board of Regents
of a community college could not base the nonrenewal of a professor’s contract on his public
criticism of the Board.82 Robert Sindermann was employed by the Board of Regents of Odessa
Junior College as a professor of Government and Social Science. Sindermann was employed
under a series of one-year contracts beginning in 1965. During the 1968-1969 academic year,
Sindermann was elected president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association and was
involved in public disagreements with the Odessa Board of Regents, including testimony he gave
before the Texas Legislature. In May 1969, the Board of Regents voted not to renew
Sindermann’s contract for an additional year.83 Sindermann brought suit alleging in part that the
Board of Regents’ decision not to rehire him was based on his public criticism of the policies of
the college administration and thus infringed his right to freedom of speech.84 Although not
making a determination on whether Sindermann’s nonrenewal was based on his constitutionally
protected speech rights, the Court applied Pickering and held “a teacher’s public criticism of his
superiors on matters of public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be
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an impermissible basis for termination of his employment.”85 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stewart stated the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected interests – especially, his interest in freedom of speech.”86 The Court
upheld the Court of Appeals judgment remanding the case back to the District Court for a
determination on the actual basis for Sindermann’s nonrenewal.87
In Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, the Court expanded the Pickering balancing test to include
causation as a factor in public employment. In cases involving both protected and unprotected
factors in employment decision, the Court reasoned an employee’s speech was not automatically
protected just because it involves a matter of public concern.88 In 1966, Fred Doyle was
employed as a non-tenured teacher by the Mt. Healthy City School District. Beginning in 1970,
Doyle was involved in several incidents of questionable behavior with both district employees
and students.89 In February 1971, the principal circulated a memo relating to teacher dress and
appearance. Doyle shared the memo with a local radio station that in turn reported it as news on
the air. A month later in his annual employment recommendations to the board, the
superintendent recommended that Doyle not be rehired for the subsequent school year, along
with nine other non-tenured teachers. Doyle requested a statement of reasons for the Board’s
decision not to rehire him. The Board provided Doyle with a statement citing “a notable lack of
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tact in handling professional matters which leaves much doubt as to your sincerity in establishing
good school relationships.”90 This general statement was followed by two examples of incidents
in which Doyle was involved, including the release of his principal’s memo to the local radio
station and the obscene gestures Doyle made to students while he was supervising in the
cafeteria.
Doyle sued claiming the Board’s refusal to renew his contract violated his rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The District Court held
Doyle’s speech rights were violated thus entitling him to reinstatement with backpay. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment and the Supreme Court granted the
Board’s petition for certiorari. Applying the Pickering balancing test, the Court affirmed the
District Court’s finding that Doyle’s communication with the local radio station was protected by
the First Amendment.91 The Court disagreed, however, with the District Court’s conclusion that
the state could never fire an employee anytime if such action was based in substantial part on
constitutionally protected behavior.92 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist explained “a
rule of causation which focuses solely on whether or not protected conduct played a part,
‘substantial’ or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position
as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had
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he done nothing.”93 The rationale behind this conclusion was based on the Court’s “reasoning
that an incompetent public employee, near termination, should not be placed in a more favorable
legal position because he engaged, at the last minute, in constitutionally protected behavior.”94
Rehnquist explained an employee “ought not be able, by engaging in such [protected] conduct, to
prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire
on the basis of that record, simply because the protected conduct makes the employer more
certain of the correctness of its decision.”95
In deciding Mt. Healthy, the Court expanded the Pickering balance test by reasoning, “in
cases involving both protected and unprotected factors, the proper test of causation when
protected speech is a factor in termination should focus on whether or not the agency would have
terminated the employee for adequate non-speech reasons, despite consideration of the protected
speech.”96 The Court noted it was not sufficient to simply determine if the protected conduct
was a substantial, or motivating, factor in the government’s employment decision. If the
employee can carry the burden of proving the speech was both protected and a motivating factor
in the decision, the test should be expanded to place the burden on the government employer to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the employer would have terminated the employee
even in the absence of the protected speech.97
In expanding the Pickering balancing test in Mt. Healthy, the Court provided government
employers an additional defense to a free speech claim. Pickering originally gave the
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government the ability to argue the interest in promoting efficient government services
outweighed an employee’s interest in speaking out on matters of public concern. Mt. Healthy
provided government employers an additional path to avoiding liability by demonstrating a
protected activity, such as speech, was merely one illegitimate reason among several legitimate
reasons for its employment decision.98
In Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., the Court expanded speech protections
to include private as well as public expression.99 Bessie Givhan, a junior high English teacher,
was dismissed from employment at the end of the 1970-1971 school year as a consequence of a
series of private encounters between Givhan and her school principal. During the encounters,
Givhan made what school officials described as “petty and unreasonable demands” in a manner
the principal described as “insulting, hostile, loud and arrogant.”100 Givhan subsequently
brought suit against the school district in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Mississippi arguing she was dismissed for questioning the school district’s
employment policies and practices, which Givhan alleged were racially discriminatory. She
claimed her dismissal violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought
reinstatement. The District Court held Givhan’s termination violated the First Amendment and
ordered her reinstatement.101 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding “because
[Givhan] had privately expressed her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expression
98
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was not protected under the First Amendment.”102 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated the ruling of the appeals court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In vacating the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the Court ruled the appellate court incorrectly
relied on the Court’s decisions in Pickering, Perry and Mt. Healthy in reasoning Givhan’s private
expression was not constitutionally protected. Delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court,
Justice Rehnquist observed, “while those cases each arose in the context of a public employee’s
public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on the largely coincidental
fact.”103 In referencing the Court’s earlier decisions in Perry and Mt. Healthy, Rehnquist further
noted, “the fact that each of these cases involved public expression by the employee was not
critical to the decision.” Rehnquist concluded, “Neither the [First] Amendment itself nor our
decisions indicate that this freedom [of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to
communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the public.”104
The Givhan ruling afforded constitutional protections to the private expression of speech
regarding matters of public concern and added another factor to consider when applying the
Pickering balancing test. The Court stated the “manner, time and place” of protected speech
must be taken into consideration in determining whether or not the protected speech would have
a negative impact on the efficient and effective functioning of government. In a footnote to their
ruling in Givhan, the Court noted the content of the employee’s statement must be taken into
consideration when applying the Pickering balance test in cases dealing with public expression
102
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but in cases of private expression, “the employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and
place in which it is delivered.”105 The Court would elaborate on this conclusion in its subsequent
decision in Connick v. Myers.106

1980’s

During the 1980’s, one of the seminal employee speech cases was decided. In Connick v.
Myers, the Court established a new threshold requirement for courts to consider prior to applying
the Pickering balancing test in employee speech cases. Sheila Myers was employed as an
assistant district attorney in New Orleans for five and a half years when she was informed by the
District Attorney, Harry Connick, she would be transferred to prosecute cases in a different
section of the criminal court. Myers objected to the transfer and expressed her opposition to her
supervisors, including Connick. Myers first spoke with Dennis Waldron, one of the First
Assistant District Attorneys and expressed not only her objection to the transfer but also her
concerns regarding internal office matters. After Waldron suggested her views were not shared
by her peers in the District Attorney’s Office, Myers prepared and distributed a questionnaire to
the fifteen assistant district attorneys in the New Orleans’s office soliciting their views regarding
internal office matters. The topics in the questionnaire included the office transfer policy, office
morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in superiors, and whether
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employees felt pressured to work on political campaigns of candidates supported by the District
Attorney.107 Shortly after learning of the questionnaire, Connick fired Myers.
In response to her termination, Myers filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern Division of Louisiana, alleging her employment was wrongfully terminated because she
exercised her constitutionally protected right to free speech.108 The District Court agreed with
Myers, ruling the termination was the result of Myers distribution of the questionnaire. The
court concluded the questionnaire addressed matters of public concern and “that the state had not
‘clearly demonstrated’ the survey ‘substantially interfered’ with the operations of the District
Attorney’s office.”109 The District Court concluded Myers free speech rights had been violated
and ordered Myers reinstated with backpay, damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling.110 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.111
In Connick, the Court ruled application of the Pickering balancing test was required only
if a court concluded the speech under scrutiny addressed matters of public concern. Delivering
the opinion of the Court, Justice White stated, “Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead
us to conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech
on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge.”112 If the subject matter in Myers’ questionnaire did not address a matter of public
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concern, the Court reasoned there would be no need to balance Myers’ right to express herself
freely with Connick’s interest in efficiently and effectively running the District Attorney’s
Office.
Establishing this new threshold requirement, the Court first turned its attention to
determining whether or not Myers’ questionnaire addressed matters of public concern. Citing its
previous decision in Bishop v. Wood, the Court explained, “when a public employee speaks not
as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of
personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee’s behavior.”113

In reviewing Myer’s questionnaire, the Court

concluded only one of the fourteen questions touched on a matter of public concern and the
remaining questions reflected, “one employee’s dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to
turn that displeasure into a cause celebre.”114 Question 11 of Myers’ questionnaire asked
assistant district attorneys if they ever felt pressured to work on political campaigns for
candidates supported by the District Attorney’s Office.115 Citing their previous decisions in CSC
v. Letter Carriers,116 and Public Workers v. Mitchell117, the Court ruled it was “apparent that the
issue of whether assistant district attorneys are pressured to work in political campaigns is a
matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to

government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”
113
Id. at 147.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 155.
116
CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
117
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1975).

31

speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”118 Because Question 11 touched on a
matter of public concern, the Court concluded the Pickering balancing test should be applied to
determine if Connick was justified in terminating Myers.
The Court concluded Myers’ creation and distribution of the questionnaire had no impact
on her ability to discharge her duties in the District Attorney’s Office. The Court focused their
attention singularly upon the questionnaire’s impact on the working relationships between the
assistant district attorneys and their supervisors. The Court agreed with the District Court’s
conclusion that the efficient and effective functioning of the District Attorney’s office required
close working relationships between the assistants and their supervisors.119 Writing for the
Court, Justice White stated, “when close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”120 The
Court also noted it was not necessary for the employer to wait until an actual disruption in the
office occurred prior to taking action. The Court concluded asking assistant district attorneys if
they had confidence in their supervisors was, “is a statement that carriers the clear potential for
undermining office relations” thus indicating Connick acted appropriately in discharging
Myers.121
In considering the questionnaire’s impact on the efficient and effective operation of the
District Attorney’s Office, the Court acknowledged in some situations, additional factors must be
considered in balancing the interest of the employee in freely expressing themselves and the
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interest of the state in efficiently and effectively operating an agency.122 Citing Given, the Court
noted, “When a government employee personally confronts his immediate superior, the
employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the
employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered.”123 In
examining the timeframe and location of Myers’ actions, the Court found that because the
questionnaire was produced at work and completed by assistant district attorneys during work
hours, Connick was justified in his belief that the questionnaire would have a negative impact on
the functioning of his office. Further, the Court reasoned the context in which the questionnaire
was produced was also significant.124 Here, the questionnaire was produced by Myers not long
after she received the transfer notice. The Court concluded, “when employee speech concerning
office policy arises from an employment dispute concerning the very application of that policy to
the speaker, additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee has
threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.”125 Concluding additional weight
must be given to his concern over the efficient and effective operation of his office, the Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held in favor of Connick.
In Connick, the Court modified the Pickering balancing test by requiring courts to first
determine as a threshold requirement whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public
concern before even applying the Pickering balancing test.126 Additionally, the Court explained
122
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that in making this determination, “the content, form and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record” must be considered.127 If the employee’s speech did not address a
matter of public concern, the Court concluded government officials should “enjoy wide latitude
in managing their offices” and “absent the most usual circumstances” federal courts are not the
proper venue for reviewing personnel decisions made by public employers.128
The Connick-Pickering framework was applied four years later in Rankin v.
McPherson.129 Ardith McPherson was a deputy in the office of the Constable of Harris County,
Texas. As a deputy constable, McPherson performed clerical duties for the Constable’s Office.
These clerical duties included entering data from paper documents into a computer that
maintained an automated record of the status of civil process in the county. McPherson was not
a commissioned peace officer and her clerical duties were performed in a room with limited
public access. On March 30, 1981, a radio broadcast announced the attempted assassination of
President Reagan. In response, McPherson remarked to a coworker “if they go for him [Reagan]
again, I hope they get him.”130 The comment was overheard by another coworker, who reported
it to Constable Rankin. Upon learning about the comment, Rankin summoned McPherson to his
office to inquire about her comment. In response to Rankin’s inquiry, McPherson admitted to
making the statement but added she “didn’t mean anything by it.”131 Upon her admission,
Rankin promptly terminated McPherson’s employment.
In response to her dismissal, McPherson brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas alleging that her constitutional right to free speech had been
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violated. The District Court ruled McPherson’s speech was not protected speech and granted
summary judgment in favor of Rankin.132 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case after concluding substantial issues of
material fact regarding the context in which the statement had been made precluded the entry of
summary judgment.133 Upon remand, the District Court again ruled in favor of Rankin
determining for a second time that McPherson’s speech was unprotected. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding McPherson’s speech did address a matter of public concern and that her
position in the Constables Office was “so utterly ministerial and her potential for undermining
the office’s mission so trivial” as to preclude Rankin’s from successfully arguing that the
expression of her political opinion undermined his ability to maintain efficiency and discipline in
the workplace.134 The Court of Appeals remanded the case for determination of an appropriate
remedy where upon the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether or not
McPherson’s speech was protected under the First Amendment.
Following Connick’s modifications to the Pickering balancing test, the Court first turned
to the threshold question of whether McPherson’s speech addressed a matter of public concern
determined by “the content, form and context of a given statement.”135 In answering this
threshold question, the Court concluded McPherson’s speech “plainly” dealt with a matter of
public concern in that her speech addressed the policies of the Reagan administration and a
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“matter of heightened public attention: an attempt on the life of the President.”136 In Rankin, the
speech in question was not directly related to the employee’s workplace.137 In previous public
employee speech cases, the employee’s speech had some direct relation to the activities of the
public employer for whom the employee worked.
After establishing Connick’s threshold requirement had been met, the Court applied the
Pickering balancing test to balance McPherson’s interest in making a statement on a matter of
public concern against Rankin’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the public services
provided by his office through its employees. Citing Given, the Court considered the time, place
and manner in which McPherson’s statement was made.138 The Court pointed out while made at
the work place the area within which McPeherson made the statement had limited public access.
This fact when considered in the absence of evidence the statement led to a conclusion the
utterance had not interfered with the efficient functioning of the Constable’s office. The Court
further observed that, “not only was McPherson’s discharge unrelated to the functioning of the
office, it was not based on any assessment by the Constable that the remark demonstrated a
character trait that made respondent unfit to perform her work.”139
In Rankin, the Court not only considered the time, place, manner and context in which
McPherson made her remark but also the level of responsibility McPherson had in the
Constable’s Office. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall stated, “in weighting the State’s
interest in discharging an employee based on any claim that the content of a statement made by
the employee somehow undermines the mission of the public employer, some attention must be
136

Id. at 386.
Mary-Rose Papandrea, supra note 50, at 2128.
138
Ranking v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 389 (1987)
139
Id.
137

36

paid to the responsibilities of the employee within the agency.”140 The Court concluded where
an “employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public contact,” the ability of that
employee to undermine the efficient functioning of the public office is “minimal.”141
Concluding McPherson’s clerical role in the Constable’s Office precluded her from having any
significant ability to undermine the efficient functioning of the office; the Court upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeals ruling that McPherson’s speech was protected under the First
Amendment.

1990’s

The Court next took up the question of disputed speech in their 1994Waters v. Churchill
ruling.142 Petitioner Cheryl Churchill was an obstetrics nurse at McDonough District Hospital
(MDH), a public hospital. During a work dinner break, Churchill was having a private
conversation regarding working conditions at the hospital with Melanie Perkins-Graham, a nurse
working in another department who was considering a transfer to obstetrics. That conversation
was overheard by two other nurses, Mary Lou Ballew and Jean Welty, and by the clinical head
of the obstetrics department, Dr. Thomas Koch. Several days after the incident, nurse Ballew
reported to Churchill’s supervisor, Cynthia Waters that Churchill had spoken disparagingly about
the working conditions in the obstetrics department and about Waters. In response to the report,
Waters along with Kathleen Davis, the hospital’s vice president of nursing, met with Perkins140
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Graham to corroborate Ballew’s report. Perkins-Graham reported Churchill had spoken
negatively about Waters and that Churchill blamed the hospital administration and Davis
specifically for “ruining MDH.”143
Churchill offered a different perspective of her conversation with Perkins-Graham.
According to Churchill, the conversation revolved primarily around the hospital’s cross-training
policy that required nurses from one department to work in another when their own department
was overstaffed. Churchill did admit to criticizing Davis but only in the context of the crosstraining policy and stated she actually defended Waters and encouraged Perkins-Graham to
transfer to obstetrics.144
Relying on the Ballew’s version of the conversation, the hospital terminated Churchill.
In response, Churchill filed an internal grievance and met with hospital president, Stephen
Hopper. After reviewing the written reports provided by Waters and Davis, Hopper denied
Churchill’s grievance. Churchill then sued the hospital claiming the firing violated her First
Amendment rights because her speech was protected, citing the Court’s previous decision in
Connick v. Myers.145 Concluding neither version of the conversation was protected under
Connick, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment to
hospital officials ruling Churchill’s speech was not a matter of public concern and even if it was
the speech had the potential to disrupt hospital operations thereby stripping its First Amendment
protection.146 Churchill’s termination was upheld.
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Churchill next appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court’s ruling, finding the speech both addressed a matter of
public concern and was not disruptive.147 Ruling in favor of Churchill, the court also concluded
the determination of whether or not the speech was protected must hinged on what the speech
actually was and not what the employer thought it was.148 In response to conflicting rulings in
the federal circuit courts regarding disputed speech, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.149
In Waters v. Churchill, the central question was not what legal test to apply to the facts of
the case. Rather the plurality opinion authored by Justice O’Connor stated, “There is no dispute
in this case about when speech by a government employee is protected under the First
Amendment.”150 The Court made it clear the legal test to be applied was the Connick-Pickering
test. The central question in Waters was whether courts should apply the Connick-Pickering test
to the employee’s speech as perceived by the employer or as perceived by a jury. Justice
O’Connor framed the central question as, “Should the court apply the Connick test to the speech
as the government employer found it to be, or should it ask the jury to determine the facts for
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itself?”151 And if the courts were to rely on the employer’s version of the speech, to what
standard should an employer be held when collecting evidence during an investigation?152
To determine whether or not the Court should apply the Connick-Pickering test to speech
as the government employer believed it to be, the justices first turned to the standard to which an
employer’s investigation must be held. Justice O’Conner reasoned, “We agree that it is
important to ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also
that they are applied through reliable procedures.”153 Here, the Court attempted to determine
what constituted a reasonable investigation by a government employer. The Court found the
standard applied to employer investigations by the Court of Appeals in this case, “would force
the government employer to come to its factual conclusions through procedures that substantially
mirror the evidentiary rules used in court.”154 The Court concluded an investigation was
appropriate if conducted with, “the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an
employment decision – discharge, suspension, reprimand, or whatever else – of the sort involved
in the particular case.”155 In applying the “reasonable manager” standard to the facts in Waters,
the Court concluded the employer’s investigation into Churchill’s speech was reasonable.156
However, the Court cautioned even if the employer’s investigation met the “reasonable
manager” standard, the potential still existed for the employer to violate an employee’s First
151
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Amendment rights. The Court concluded it was required not only to consider the reasonableness
of the employer’s investigation but also the reasonableness of the conclusions the employer drew
from the investigation. In its ruling, the Court stated it did not have to apply the Connick test
“only to the facts as the employer though them to be, without considering the reasonableness of
the employer’s conclusions.”157 In its consideration of the hospital’s conclusions resulting from
their investigation of Churchill’s speech, the Court found the hospital “really did” believe
Perkins-Graham’s and Ballew’s recollection of the conversation between Churchill and PerkinsGraham and the hospital’s conclusion that Churchill’s speech had the potential for disrupting
hospital operations was indeed reasonable.158 The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if the Churchill’s dismissal
was actually the result of her speech or something else. In Waters, the Court recognized the right
of public employers to terminate an employee for what the employer thought they said as long as
the employer could prove a “reasonable” investigation was conducted and the conclusions drawn
from that investigation were “reasonable.”
A year after Waters, the Court considered the constitutionality of a broad ban on the
speech rights of federal employees in United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union
(NETU).159 Here, the Court did not consider employee’s actual speech but rather the statutory
impediment to an employee’s ability to freely express themselves.160 Passed by Congress in
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1989, the Ethics Reform Act161 in part amended Section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978162 creating a ban on the acceptance of honoraria by nearly all employees working for the
federal branch of the government. The 1989 Act defined “honorarium” to include any
compensation paid to a Government employee for “an appearance, speech or article.”163 Two
unions and several career federal civil servants filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia alleging the honoraria ban infringed upon their First Amendment free
speech rights. The District Court certified the National Treasury Employees Unions as the
representative of a class composed of all Executive Branch employees below grade GS-16. The
District Court granted the employees’ motion for summary judgment. In its decision, the court
held the ban was “unconstitutional insofar as it applied to Executive Branch employees of the
United States government,” and enjoined the government from further enforcement of the ban
against Executive Branch employees.164 Recognizing the government had an interest in
maintaining “the integrity of, and popular confidence in and respect for, the federal government,”
the court nevertheless concluded while the government’s intention was reasonable the ban was
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overly broad in suppressing employees’ free speech rights.165 Upon appeal by the government,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the lower court’s ruling
noting, “even though Section 501(b) prohibits no speech, the denial of compensation places a
significant burden on employees.”166 The appeals court agreed with the lower court’s finding
that the government had an interest in “protecting the integrity and efficiency of public service”
but ruled “the absence of evidence of either corruption or the appearance of corruption among
lower level federal employees receiving honoraria with no connection to their employment”
made the honoraria ban unconstitutional.167 The Court of Appeals modified the ban limiting
application to members of Congress, officers and employees of Congress, judicial officers and
judicial employees. Following the denial of the Court of Appeals for rehearing en banc, the U.S.
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Stevens’ opinion highlighted the literary works of federal employees such as
Nathaniel Hawthorne and Herman Melville and their “significant contributions to the
marketplace of ideas” in suggesting the honoraria ban could limit federal employees from
making such future contributions.168 Citing Pickering, the Court reasoned although respondents
worked for the federal government, “they [had] not relinquished ‘the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public concern.’”169 In
examining the employees’ speech, the Court found that except for a limited number of
165
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exceptions, the banned speech had nothing to do with the employees’ work with the federal
government and the audiences were not composed of co-workers or supervisors but were
members of the general public. Justice Stevens wrote, “Neither the character of the authors, the
subject matter of their expression, the effect of the content of their expression on their official
duties, nor the kind of audiences they address has any relevance to their employment.” 170 The
Court concluded the employee speech in this case fell within the constitutionally protected
category of “citizen comment on matters of public concern” thereby shifting the burden to the
government to justify the ban’s existence.171
According to the Court, the burden placed on the government to demonstrate the need for
the broad honoraria was “heavy.” This was because the ban had the potential to “chill” speech
before it happened. Therefore, the Court reasoned the government would need to “show that the
interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and future employees in a broad
range of present and future expression are outweighed by the expression’s ‘necessary impact on
the actual operation’ of the Government.”172 The government’s argument for the ban was that it
reduced the potential of federal officers using their influential positions within government for
personal profit and thereby negatively impacting the federal government’s operational efficiency.
Although primarily concerned with Members of Congress, the government argued that a more
limited ban would place an undue burden upon federal agencies charged with monitoring the
ban. The Court disagreed. Citing the Rankin decision, Justice Stevens wrote “Although
operational efficiency is undoubtedly a vital government interest, several features of the
honoraria ban’s text cast serious doubt on the Government’s submission that Congress perceived
170
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honoraria as so threatening to the efficiency of the entire federal service as to render the ban a
reasonable response to the threat.”173 The Court noted that only expressive activities were
included in the ban even though several government commissions recommended banning
payments for activities such as consulting and serving on boards. After examining the actual text
of the ban, the Court concluded, “These anomalies in the text of the statue and regulations
underscore our conclusion: The speculative benefits the honoraria ban may provide the
Government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted burden on respondents’ freedom to
engage in expressive activities.” Refusing to modify the ban, the Court and remanded the case
for further proceedings.

2000’s

In City of San Diego v. Roe, the Supreme Court decided a case involving off duty
speech.174 John Roe was a police officer with the San Diego Police Department (SDPD). Roe’s
supervisor discovered Roe was selling copies of a video showing himself stripping off a police
uniform and masturbating. However, the police uniform was not an official SDPD uniform. Roe
sold the videos on the adults-only section of eBay with the username Code3stud@aol.com. Roe
also sold custom videos and police equipment, including official SDPD uniforms. Upon
discovering Roe’s activities, Roe’s supervisor notified a SDPD police captain who in turn
reported Roe’s activities to the SDPD’s internal affairs department. Internal affairs investigated
Roe’s activity and concluded Roe had violated SDPD policies, including engaging in conduct
173
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unbecoming of an officer and immoral conduct. Roe admitted selling the videos, equipment and
uniforms and was ordered by SDPD to “cease displaying, manufacturing, distributing or selling
any sexually explicit materials or engaging in any similar behavior.”175 As a result of SDPD’s
orders, Roe removed some of the items but did not change his eBay profile, which described his
videos and listed their prices. Discovering the profile had not been deleted, the SDPD
terminated Roe for disobedience by failing to follow lawful orders.
In response to his termination, Roe brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California arguing his termination violated his First Amendment right to free
speech. Citing Connick v. Myers, the District Court found in favor of the City, concluding Roe
did not demonstrate his activities constituted expression relating to a matter of public concern.
Roe appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Relying on NTEU, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court finding Roe’s conduct fell within the
protected category of citizen comment on a matter of public concern and Roe’s expression was
not “an internal workplace grievance, took place while he was off duty and away from his
employer’s premises, and was unrelated to his employment.”176 The Supreme Court granted the
City’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
Reviewing the decision, the Supreme Court found the appellate court’s reliance on NTEU
was “seriously misplaced.”177 In NTEU, the Court held “when government employees speak or
write on their own time on topics unrelated to their employment, the speech can have First
Amendment protection, absent some governmental justification ‘far stronger than mere
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speculation’ in regulating it.178 In examining Roe’s activities, the Court disagreed with the
Appeals Court’s finding Roe’s activities were unrelated to his employment. In its per curiam
decision, the Court concluded “far from confining his activities to speech unrelated to his
employment, Roe took deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his police work, all
in a way injurious to his employer.”179 Rather than relying NTEU, the Court found the proper
precedential cases were Pickering and Connick.
The Court first turned to the threshold test established in Connick, requiring courts to first
determine whether or not the speech in question was on a matter of public concern. In its
opinion, the Court reviewed Connick’s instruction “direct[ing] courts to examine the ‘content,
form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record’ in assessing whether an
employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern.’”180 Applying Connick’s directive, the
Court concluded Roe’s expression was not on a matter of public concern and therefor failed the
threshold test. As a result, the Court concluded it was not required to apply the Pickering
balancing test and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding Roe’s termination.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court modified the threshold requirement outlined in Connick
and in doing so created a new bright-line rule for deciding public employee speech cases.181
Richard Ceballos was employed as a calendar deputy for the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office. As a calendar deputy, Ceballos exercised certain supervisory responsibilities
over other lawyers. A defense attorney contacted Ceballos in February 2000 regarding what the
defense attorney believed to be inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant in a
178
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pending criminal case. The defense attorney asked Ceballos to investigate the inaccuracies.
Upon the completion of his investigation, Ceballos concluded the affidavit contained “serious
misrepresentations” and contacted the deputy sheriff from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department responsible for affidavit.182 Not satisfied with the deputy sheriff’s explanation of the
perceived inaccuracies, Ceballos informed his superiors, Carol Najera and Frank Sundstedt of his
findings.183 Ceballos also prepared a memo recommending dismissal of the pending criminal
case.
In response to Ceballos’s memo, a meeting was held to discuss the affidavit. The
meeting attendants included Ceballos, Sundstedt, Najera, the deputy sheriff responsible for the
affidavit and other representatives from the sheriff’s department. The meeting was alleged to
have been heated with representatives from the sheriff’s department criticizing Ceballos for his
handling of the case.184 After the meeting and over Ceballos’s objections, Sundstedt decided to
proceed with the case. Ceballos informed Najera he was constitutionally obligated to disclose
his memo to defense counsel. As a result of this disclosure Ceballos was called by the defense to
testify during the trial.185 Following his testimony, Ceballos claimed he was subjected to a series
of retaliatory employment actions including reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a
trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse and denial of a promotion.186
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In response to these perceived retaliatory actions, Ceballos initiated an employment
grievance, which was denied. He subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California alleging his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated. Ceballos argued he had been retaliated against for his memo regarding the affidavit.
The District Court granted summary judgment holding because Ceballos wrote the memo
pursuant to his employment duties, he was not entitled to First Amendment protection from the
memo’s contents.187 Ceballos appealed his case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, “holding ‘Ceballos’s allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum
constitute protected speech under the First Amendment.’”188 The Court of Appeals applied the
Connick-Pickering test to the facts of the case and found Ceballos’s memo recited what he
thought to be governmental misconduct, which the court concluded was inherently a matter of
public concern.189 Concluding Ceballos’s speech touched on a matter of public concern, the
court next applied the Pickering balancing test and concluded the District Attorney’s Office
failed to “even suggest” Ceballos’ memo resulted in any actual or perceived disruption to
services.190
Judge O’Scannlain, in his concurrence to the court’s opinion, argued “the Supreme
Court’s use of the words ‘as a citizen’ and ‘upon matters of public concern’ in Pickering clearly
indicated a twofold threshold requirement for First Amendment protection of public employee
speech.”191 O’Scannlain also emphasized the distinction between speech offered by a public
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employee acting as an employee and that spoken by an employee acting as a citizen expressing
their personal beliefs.192 According to O’Scannlain, “when public employees speak in the course
of carrying out their routine, required employment obligations, they have no personal interest in
the content of that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right.”193 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties was
protected under the First Amendment.
Delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy stated Pickering and the cases that
followed established “two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections
accorded to public employee speech.”194 Citing Connick’s threshold requirement, the Court first
needed to decide if an employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.195 If the
threshold requirement could not be reached, the speech in question should be afforded
constitutional protections. If the speech in question met the threshold requirement, “then [the]
question [became] whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.”196 Justice
Kennedy acknowledged applying these tests to speech cases sometimes proved to be difficult
due to the “enormous variety of fact situations” in public employee speech cases. 197
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy concluded the Court’s overarching objectives were evident.198
After reviewing the Court’s previous decisions in public employee speech cases, the
Court returned to the threshold inquiry required by Connick. Focusing on the relationship
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between Ceballos’ speech and his employment as a calendar deputy, Justice Kennedy wrote “the
fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about
how best to proceed with a pending case – distinguishes Ceballos’ case from those in which the
First Amendment provides protection against discipline.”199 The Court held “when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”200 The Court further concluded, “restricting speech
that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”201 The Court ruled public
employers have the right to control speech they commissioned or created.
In Garcetti, the Court focused not on whether Ceballos’ statements were on a matter of
public concern but upon whether Ceballos was speaking as a public citizen or a government
employee. Justice Kennedy reasoned the Court’s precedents on public employee speech
supported their decision to pay particular attention to the relationship between the speaker and
his employment. Justice Kennedy pointed out prior decisions recognized the importance of
government employers’ need to manage their operations.202 The Court reasoned, “Supervisors
must ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound
judgment, and promote the employer’s mission.”203 The Court held if Ceballos’ employers
found his memo to be “inflammatory or misguided” they had the right to “take proper corrective
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action.”204 The Court concluded only when an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter
of public concern is the Court required to balance the competing interests of employee and
employer, as outlined in Pickering. The Court found to do otherwise, “would be to demand
permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree
inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”205 In reversing
the Court of Appeal’s decision, the Supreme Court suggested a possible avenue to deal with
speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties was through “internal policies and
procedures that are receptive to employee criticism,” but not through judicial intervention. 206
Justice Stevens’ dissent joined by Justices Souter and Breyer argued, “the notion that
there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s
employment is quite wrong.”207 Citing Givhan, Justice Stevens argued the Court had no
difficulty in recognizing the First Amendment rights of Bessie Givhan, the public school teacher
that spoke out about her school’s racist employment practices. In Givhan, the Court did not
deliberate over whether or not Bessie Givhan spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern or
as a public employee pursuant to her job responsibilities. Justice Stevens argued the Court’s
silence as to whether or not her speech was made pursuant to her job duties demonstrated the
point was immaterial.208 Also dissenting, Justice Souter joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
argued “private and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and
safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient implementation of policy, and when

204

Id. at 423.
Id.
206
Id. at 424.
207
Id. at 427.
208
Id.
205

52

they do public employees who speak on these matters in the course of their duties should be
eligible to claim First Amendment protection.”209
Garcetti created a new bright line rule to be applied to public employee speech cases. 210
Prior to Garcetti, courts first applied Connick’s threshold requirement to determine if the public
employee’s speech touched on a matter of public concern. For almost forty years, courts paid
little attention to whether the employee spoke as a citizen.211 As a result of the Garcetti decision,
courts now must first determine if a public employee spoke as a citizen or as an employee
pursuant to their official duties. If a public employee speaks pursuant to their official duties, they
run afoul of Garcetti’s bright line rule and their speech is not entitled to First Amendment
protections. The Court refused to define what constituted speech pursuant to an employee’s
official duties. Writing for the majority Court, Justice Kennedy stated because the parties did not
dispute that Ceballos’ speech was made pursuant to his employment duties, the Court had “no
occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties
in cases where there is room for serious debate.”212 The Court rejected the argument that
employers could restrict an employee’s speech right by creating broad job descriptions. Noting
job descriptions often don’t reflect an employee’s actual duties, the Court argued “the listing of a
given task in an employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for
209
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First Amendment purposes.”213 The Court suggested the proper inquiry into whether an
employee spoke pursuant to his official duties was “a practical one.”214 This vague language has
led to varying interpretations among the Circuit Courts.

Post Garcetti Circuit Court Decisions

Post Garcetti, the federal appellate courts have been left to decide what constitutes
speech pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.215 As a result, the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal have relied on a variety of factors for determining if an employee’s speech is
made pursuant to their official duties.216 These factors have been applied on a case-by-case basis
and have led to differing approaches among the circuit courts in deciding First Amendment
public employee speech cases.217 Some circuits have broadly defined speech made pursuant to
an employee’s official duties, while other circuits have relied on a much more narrow reading of
the Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision.218 Some circuits apply a standard that asks whether the
employee’s speech is required by their job while other circuits ask whether the speech aids or
furthers the execution of the employee’s responsibilities and duties.219 This section provides a
213
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chronological overview of post-Garcetti circuit court decisions in which the appellate courts
explained their varying interpretations of Garcetti and provided frameworks or rules in which
future cases before their circuit would be decided.220

2006

In 2006, the Seventh Circuit was one of the first circuit courts to interpret Garcetti. In
Mills v. City of Evansville, the Seventh Circuit held critical statements made by a police sergeant
at a work meeting were not protected by the First Amendment.221 Brenda Mills was a sergeant
with the police department in Evansville, Indiana, in charge of supervising crime prevention
officers (CPOs) during her shift.222 After a meeting where Chief David Gulledge outlined plans
to reduce the number of CPOs under Mills command, Mills told senior managers the chief’s plan
would not work and community organizers would “not let the change happen.”223 Following the
exchange, Mills had a negative review of the incident placed in her personnel file, was moved
from her supervisory position to patrol duty and stripped of the unlimited use of a department
car.224 Although restored to her supervisory position, Mills brought suit against her employer in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, alleging she had been
retaliated against on account of her speech.225 The district court ruled, “Mills’s statements at the
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meeting [were] protected…because she addressed issues of public concern but that the
department’s interest in efficient management of its operations must prevail.”226
The Seventh Circuit granted Mills’ appeal. Examining the Garcetti decision, the Seventh
Circuit concluded courts must first decide whether an employee was speaking as a citizen or “as
part of [their] public job,” before considering whether the subject matter of the speech touched
on a matter of public concern.227 Considering the context of her speech, the court found, “Mills
was on duty, in uniform, and engaged in discussion with her superiors,” and “spoke in her
capacity as a public employee contributing to the formation and execution of official policy.”228
After examining the context of Mills’ statements, the court ruled her statements were made
pursuant to her official duties and “the Constitution [did] not insulate [her] communications from
employer discipline.”229
In McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, the Eighth Circuit held a public employee’s speech was
unprotected by the First Amendment because the employee’s speech owed its existence to the
employee’s professional responsibilities.230 Mark McGee was employed by Jefferson County
Public Water Supply District #2 as District Manager. In this capacity, McGee was responsible
for the operation of the water treatment plant. During the course of his employment, McGee
made critical comments regarding repairs made at the water treatment plant. In addition, McGee
initiated several arguments regarding the repairs with other District #2 employees and two
members of the District #2 Board. During one exchange with a District #2 board member,
McGee threatened to bulldoze an area of the water treatment plant, alleging contractors had
226
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improperly repaired a septic tank leaving a nearby river at risk for contamination.231 A day after
McGee’s exchange with the District #2 Board Member, McGee expressed concern that a
contractor was not performing required water tests while removing sections of a pipe containing
asbestos. The following day, the District #2 Board eliminated McGee’s position.232
In response to the elimination of his position, McGee brought suit against his employer in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri alleging he was discharged in
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled McGee’s speech
criticizing the repairs undertaken at the water treatment plant, “did not involve protected speech
because he ‘was not speaking as a concerned citizen but rather was speaking and functioning as
an employee who was performing his job.’”233 McGee appealed the decision.
On appeal from the district court, the Eighth Circuit applied its interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Garcetti to affirm the lower court’s ruling. Citing Garcetti, the
Eighth Circuit noted, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”234 McGee argued “that
Garcetti ‘does not impact’ [his] appeal because he was removed from the water pipe relocation
project and was told not to concern himself with the septic tank problem.’”235 Because he was
told not to be involved with the repairs at the plant, McGee argued his comments regarding the
septic tank and asbestos removal projects were made as a citizen and not pursuant to his official
job duties as District Manager. The court disagreed, finding McGee’s statements about the
231
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repairs at the water treatment plant fell under his general supervisory duties as District Manager
and his admitted duty to advise the Board regarding regulatory and legal requirements. 236 The
court further concluded the Board’s elimination of the McGee’s position, “was an exercise of the
Board’s managerial discretion that Garcetti expressly leaves to public employers, not to the
federal courts applying the First Amendment.”237 Because McGee’s comments were related to
duties he would, “actually be expected to perform,” as District Manager, the Eighth Circuit
found his comments were not protected under the First Amendment.238
The Eleventh Circuit also decided a 2006 public employee speech case in the wake of
Garcetti. In Battle v. Bd. of Regents, the Eleventh Circuit held a financial aid advisor’s attempts
to expose alleged fraud by her superior were not protected by the First Amendment. Lillian
Battle was a financial aid counselor in the Office of Financial Aid and Veteran Affairs (“OFA”)
at Fort Valley State University (“FVSU”).239 As a financial aid counselor, Battle was required to
verify the completion and accuracy of student files and report potential fraud.240 Upon
examining files previously handled by her supervisor, OFA Director Jeanette Huff, Battle
discovered what she believed to be “fraudulent mishandling and mismanagement of Federal
financial aid funds.”241 In 1996, Battle confronted Huff about the alleged fraud and met with
FVSU President Oscar Prater. Battle explained to Prater that Huff, “was falsifying information,
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awarding financial aid to ineligible recipients, making excessive awards, and forging
documents.”242 No action was taken by either Huff or Prater.
In 1998, Battle’s evaluation contained criticisms of her performance, Battle responded in
the comments section stating, “I feel that I am being treated unfairly.”243 In response to the
criticisms, Battle met with FVSU Vice-President of Student Affairs Cynthia Sellers. At that
meeting, Battle informed Sellers about Huff’s alleged misconduct and warned that, “she was
going to tell.”244 Battle also met for a second time with President Prater regarding her evaluation
and “to reiterate the improprieties” in the OFA.245 In May 1998, Battle was informed her
contract would not be renewed. Battle appealed to the Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia. A grievance committee investigated and the decision to not renew Battle’s
contract was upheld.246 Following the non-renewal of her contract, Battle met with officials
from the Department of Education (“DOE”) and provided documents to support her claims of
alleged fraud in the OFA. In April 2002, FVSU reached a $2,167,941 settlement with the DOE
to settle questioned costs in state audits that revealed a “series [of] noncompliance with federal
regulations.”247
In June 2002, Battle filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia alleging in part she was discharged in violation of the First Amendment for reporting
her concerns about fraud.248 The district court ruled against Battle, finding her employer did not
violate Battle’s free speech rights, “because the motivation for [Battle’s] speech was unclear and
242
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preexisting case law did not give [her employer] a fair warning that [Battle’s] speech must be
treated as ‘a matter of public concern’ under the circumstances.249 Battle appealed the district
court’s ruling to the Eleventh Circuit.
In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit laid out the central question in the case stating, “In
determining whether a public employee’s speech is entitled to constitutional protection, we must
first ask ‘whether an employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.’”250 Citing
Garcetti, the court asserted, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”251 Turning to
the specific facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Battle, “admitted that she had a
clear employment duty to ensure the accuracy and completeness of student files as well as to
report any mismanagement or fraud she encountered in the student financial aid files.”252 The
court pointed out Department of Education guidelines required all financial aid workers,
including Battle, to report suspected fraud.253 The court also acknowledged Battle herself
alleged her contract was not renewed because of her, “continuous efforts to expose fraud within
FVSU’s Financial Aid Department.”254 Because Battle admitted it was within her employment
duty to report fraud and Department of Education guidelines required her to report fraud, the
Eleventh Circuit ruled Battle’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties and therefore not
249
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protected by the First Amendment.255 According to the court, FVSU could constitutionally fire
Battle for reporting suspected fraud even though she was required both by law and her job to do
so.256

2007

In 2007, the circuit courts decided a number of post-Garcetti public employee speech
cases including: Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007); Foraker v. Chaffinch, 509 F.3d
231 (3rd Cir. 2007); Williams v. Dallas Independent School District, 480 F.3d 689 (5th Cir. 2007);
Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2007); Vose v. Klement, 506 F.3d 564 (7th
Cir. 2007); Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District, 473 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir.
2007); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks (10th Cir.); D’Angelo v. School Board of Polk County,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18235 (11th Cir.); Khan v. Fernandez-Rundle, 287 Fed. Appx. 50 (11th
Cir. 2007).
In Curran v. Cousins, the First Circuit held the Essex County Sheriff’s Department did
not violate the free speech rights of an officer when it terminated the officer for making threats
against his superiors in the department. Joseph Curran was employed by the Essex County
Sheriff’s Department as a corrections officer in June 1991. Frank Cousins, Jr. was appointed
Sheriff of Essex County in 1996. During Cousins’ 2004 reelection, Curran served as campaign
manager for Cousins’ opponent. Cousins won reelection. Thereafter, Curran was removed from
the Department’s Tactical Team. In October 2005, Curran was confronted by Department
255
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Captain Arthur Statezni regarding the legitimacy of a sick day taken by Curran the previous
month. During that exchange, Curran threatened Statezni telling him he and the other captains
were “gonna get shot.”257 A disciplinary hearing was held thereafter and the Department found
Curran’s comments to Statezni to be “threatening and menacing.”258 Curran was suspended for
thirty days.
Curran also utilized the public discussion board on his union’s website to disparage both
the department and his superiors. On August 1, 2004, Curran posted a message comparing the
sheriff and senior officers to Hitler and Nazi officers.259 On November 30, 2005, Curran posted
a message on the discussion board alleging administrators were failing to speak out against the
“unfairness of the discipline and harassment being doled out to political/union rivals of the
sheriff.”260 At the end of his message, Curran gave a, “totally unrelated history lesson.” It read:
During WWII Adolf Hitler’s (whose motto was “Have no pit! Act brutally!”),
generals were deathly afraid of him followed orders regardless of how
immoral/wrong the orders were. Near the end, some of the generals realized just
how wrong the orders were and started to plot against him knowing that the end
was inevitable. Well you know how the story ended. My point is that the right
thing is not always the easy thing. Stay strong my brothers/sisters and I’ll see you
at the Union Party.261
In response to the posting, Curran was subjected to another disciplinary hearing on February 13,
2006, and subsequently terminated for his “threatening and/or insubordinate manner while on
257
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duty,” and conduct, “tend[ing] to adversely affect the operations of the Department by prompting
employees to second-guess direct orders.”262
On March 30, 2006, Curran brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts against Sheriff Cousins and Special Sheriff Thomas C. Goff alleging in
part the violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court found, “while Curran’s
November 30 posting narrowly involved a matter of public concern, the interests served by his
speech were outweighed by the Department’s legitimate interests in preventing disruptions in
carrying out its mission of law enforcement and maintenance of a correctional institution.”263
Curran appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit.
In its decision, the First Circuit cited Garcetti stating, “Garcetti [had] clarified and
expanded on the earlier [public employee speech] law.”264 In its analysis of Garcetti, the First
Circuit concluded the threshold inquiry in public employee speech cases was to determine
“whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”265 The First Circuit
further concluded the threshold inquiry had two parts. The first part required courts to determine
if the employee spoke as a private citizen before turning to the second part requiring courts to
determine if the speech was on a matter of public concern.266 Applying this test to Curran’s
threatening exchange with Statezni over his use of a sick day, the First Circuit found, “Curran’s
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initial threats were made not as a citizen, but were made in the course of his duties within the
Department, to his superiors, and during a discussion of official Department policy.”267
The court next turned to examining Curran’s November 30 posting on the union
discussion board. Here, the court held because the union website was “open to public posting
and viewing,” Curran was acting as a citizen when posting to the message board.268 The court
also held the first and second paragraphs of Curran’s November 30 posting could, “be read as
accusing Cousins of using political favoritism rather than merit in making personnel decisions as
to non-policymaking employees,” and, “a public official basing personnel actions, as to nonpolicymaking employees, on political affiliation rather than merit is a topic of public concern.”269
In regards to Curran’s November 30 posting, the First Circuit found Curran spoke as a citizen on
a matter of public concern, passing the threshold inquiry outlined in Garcetti. Next, the court
turned to determining if the Department had “adequate justification” for terminating Curran.270
In their determination, the court found the speech in Curran’s November 30 posting, “included
speech going far beyond providing information in which there was a legitimate public interest,”
and contained speech that was, “vulgar, insulting, and defiant.”271 The court reasoned such
speech was “entitled to less weight in the Pickering balance.”272 The court found Curran’s
statements, “went directly to impairing discipline by superiors, disrupting harmony and creating
friction in working relationships, undermining confidence in the administration, invoking
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oppositional personal loyalties, and interfering with the regular operation of the [department].”273
In applying the Pickering balancing test, the First Circuit concluded the department’s interest in
efficiently and effectively managing its operations outweighed Curran’s interest in exercising his
freedom of speech. The decision court’s decision was affirmed.
In Foraker v. Chaffinch, the Third Circuit held the First Amendment did not protect the
concerns raised to supervisors by two Delaware State Troopers over working conditions at a
Delaware State Police (DSP) firing range. Troopers Price and Warren were employed as
instructors in the DSP Firearms Training Unit and assigned to a DSP indoor firing range. The
range and those who used it encountered problems since its opening.274 Price and Warren
described the working conditions at the firing range as “intolerable.”275 The troopers specifically
expressed to their DSP supervisors concerns with malfunctioning equipment and the detection of
elevated levels of heavy metals in blood samples taken from personnel working at the firing
range. In March 2004, the DSP closed the firing range and an investigation by the State Auditor
ensued. Price and Warren met with the State Auditor during the course of the investigation.
After their meeting, the troopers’ attorney released to the local newspaper verbatim statements
made by the troopers to the State Auditor regarding conditions at the firing range. As a result of
their failure to follow DSP policy prohibiting troopers from speaking to the press without
supervisory approval, Price and Warren were placed on light duty.
In response to being placed on light duty, Price and Warren brought suit against DSP in
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware alleging in part the violation of their

273

Id.
Foraker v. Chaffinch, 504 F.3d 231, 233 (3rd Cir. 2007).
275
Id.
274

65

First Amendment free speech rights.276 The district court held the First Amendment did not
protect the troupers’ speech, “because their reports to the DSP chain of command and statements
to the Auditor were part of their official duties as Troopers and they had been ordered to
cooperate.”277 The troopers appealed the district court’s ruling. The Third Circuit considered
whether their speech was protected in light of Garcetti.278
In their appeal, the troopers argued the First Amendment protected expressing their
concerns about the working conditions at the firing range up the chain of command and to the
State Auditor, “because it exposed serious health and safety concerns and exposed government
incompetence and wrongdoing.”279 The troopers asserted Garcetti had no impact on their case
because as fire arms instructors their job duties entailed instructing students on how to fire
weapons; not speaking out about health and safety problems at the firing range.280 The troopers
further argued the release of their statements to the State Auditor by their attorney was not
pursuant to their job duties, and therefore protected by the First Amendment.281 The Third
Circuit disagreed. The court concluded because Price and Warren possessed specialized
knowledge of the proper functioning of the equipment at the firing range and that properly
functioning equipment was required to successfully conduct their educational programs, it was
within the troopers’ job function to report problems with the equipment to their superiors within
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DSP.282 The court found, “Price and Warren were expected, pursuant to their job duties, to
report problems concerning the operations at the range up the chain of command.”283
The court also rejected Price and Warren’s argument that they were not functioning
within the scope of their employment duties when they made their statements to the State
Auditor. The court recognized giving statements to the State Auditor was not part of the
troopers’ everyday duties, however, the court found the troopers’ statements to the State Auditor
were prompted by previous statements made by the troopers up the chain of command within
DSP and the Troopers were ordered to speak to the State Auditor by the Governor’s Office.284
The court concluded the Troopers were “expected to report truthfully to the State Auditor upon
being ordered to do so.”285 Because Price and Warren were speaking pursuant to their
employment duties when they made their concerns about conditions at the firing range known to
their supervisors up the chain of command and the State Auditor, the Third Circuit ruled their
speech was not protected under the First Amendment.
In Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., the Fifth Circuit ruled the First Amendment did
not protect a high school’s athletic director’s memos to a school district office manager and
school principal expressing his concerns over an athletic department account.286 Gregory
Williams was employed as the Athletic Director and Head Football Coach with the Dallas
Independent School District. Prior to the start of the 2003 school year, Williams requested
information regarding an athletic account from the school’s office manager. Upon the office
manager’s refusal to give Williams information regarding the account, Williams composed
282
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several memos to the office manager and principal expressing his dismay over their refusal to
provide him the information he requested. Four days after receiving the memo from Williams,
the principal of the school removed Williams as athletic director. Williams was later placed on
administrative leave and his contract was not renewed that spring.287
In response to the non-renewal of his contract, Williams filed suit against the school
district in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas alleging retaliation
for engaging in speech protected by the First and Fourth Amendments. The district court found
in favor of the school district, holding Williams’s memo to the principal did not address a matter
of public concern and therefore was not protected under the First Amendment.288 Williams
appealed the district court’s decision. On appeal the Fifth Circuit considered whether Williams’s
speech was protected under the First Amendment.
In his appeal, William’s asserted his memos to the office manager and principal were
protected under the First Amendment because he wrote them as a “taxpayer” and a “father.”289
Williams further argued his memos were “identical to that in Pickering v. Board of Education,”
suggesting like Pickering, he too was protesting the misappropriation and discriminatory funding
of his school district and therefore speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.290 The
school district conceded Williams was not required as the Athletic Director to write memos
regarding athletic accounts. Garcetti, the Fifth Circuit stated, required a review the facts of the
case and a determination of, “the extent to which… a public employee is protected by the First
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Amendment if his speech is not necessarily required by his job duties but nevertheless is related
to his job duties.”291
In interpreting Garcetti, the Fifth Circuit concluded public employee speech cases, “when
viewed as a whole, distinguish speech that is ‘the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who do
not work for the government’ and activities undertaken in the course of performing one’s job.”292
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded the speech contained in Williams’s memos
pertained to his “daily operations” as Athletic Director.293 The court found as Athletic Director,
Williams needed information about the athletic account to “operate the athletic department.”294
Because Williams’s memos were written in the course of performing his job as Athletic Director,
the Fifth Circuit ruled the First Amendment did not protect his speech.295
In Haynes v. City of Circleville, the Sixth Circuit held a police officer’s speech regarding
cutbacks to his department’s canine unit was not protected speech under the First Amendment
because the officer’s speech was made pursuant to his professional duties.296 David Hayes was
employed as a patrolman and a canine handler for the City of Circleville. Hayes claimed the
canine unit established in 1996 was created in part due to his input. Hayes also claimed the
department considered him to be the administrator of the canine program as well as a handler.297
As the department’s canine handler, Hayes spent 12 hours per week traveling and training his
dog at a training facility located outside of Circleville. In February of 2003, Chief of Police
Harold Gray instituted cutbacks in the canine unit limiting travel and training time for canine
291
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handlers to eight hours every three weeks. Hayes objected to the cutbacks and wrote a lengthy
memo to Chief Gray expressing his displeasure with the reduced training time.298 In the memo,
Hayes warned the chief of a “series negative consequences” resulting from the cutbacks to the
canine unit and suggested the chief would later be accused of “deliberate indifference,”
“negligence” and “failure to train” as a result of the reduction in training time.299
Three days after delivering the memo to Chief Gray, a scheduling officer called Hayes
not long before the start of his regular work shift and asked him to report early to assist with a
drug search. Hayes refused. After his refusal, Chief Gray relieved Hayes of his canine handler
duties and subsequently placed Hayes on administrative leave pending a psychological
examination. Sometime shortly thereafter, officers were dispatched to Hayes’s house to pick up
his canine equipment. Hayes provided the officers his equipment wrapped up as a Christmas gift
with a Daffy Duck tag addressed to Chief Gray stating, “Do not open until Christmas.”300 At a
subsequent disciplinary hearing, Hayes was accused of “multiple counts of insubordination,
neglect of duty, unsatisfactory performance, disrespect, failure to report to duty as required,
conduct unbecoming an officer, and sick-leave violations.”301 Thereafter, Hayes was fired. In
response to his termination, Hayes brought suit against the City of Circleville and Chief Gray in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging retaliatory discharge
based on the exercise of his First Amendment rights.302
In considering Hayes’s allegations of First Amendment violations, the Sixth Circuit first
examined the context of the police officer’s speech to determine if his statements were made
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“pursuant to his duties as a canine handler and patrolman for Circleville.”303 The court found
Hayes was involved in the development of the canine program; was the author of the program’s
standard operating procedures and; was considered the de facto administrator of the canine
program.304 Hayes admitted both his “Christmas present” and memo to Chief Gray were in
response to the cutbacks in the canine unit.305 The court concluded Hayes’ memo to the Chief
Gray was written as a result of the officer’s concern over the cutbacks in the canine training
program and, “the context of the memo as a whole [was] best characterized as that of a
disgruntled employee upset that his professional suggestions were not followed as they had been
in the past.”306 The court ruled the officer was acting not as a private citizen but as a public
employee carrying out his professional duties when he lodged his complaints to the chief about
the cutbacks.307 In support of their conclusion Hayes was acting pursuant to his official duties,
the Court noted the officer, “communicated solely to his superior… indicating that he was
speaking ‘in [his] capacity as a public employee contributing to the formation and execution of
official policy.’”308 After considering both the context of the speech and the audience to whom it
was directed, the Sixth Circuit cited Garcetti, to support the conclusions Hayes’ speech was
unprotected because it was made pursuant to his official duties.309
In another 2007 decision, Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., the Sixth Circuit held a park
ranger’s comments to a consultant hired by her employer as part of a departmental evaluation
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were not protected by the First Amendment.310 Denise Weisbarth was employed as a park ranger
with the Geauga Park District. In 2003, the park district hired a paid consultant, Richard
Sherwood, to evaluate the department, including allegations of morale and performance
problems.311 As part of his evaluation, Sherwood rode along with Weisbarth in her patrol
vehicle on one of her shifts. At this time Weisbarth discussed with Sherwood a recent
disciplinary letter she received from the park district and her intention to write a rebuttal.312 At
Sherwood’s prompting, Weisbarth also shared her thoughts regarding “morale and performance
problems within the Ranger Department.”313 Weisbarth alleged as a result of her conversation
with Sherwood during the ride along, Sherwood labeled Weisbarth a “source of friction” and
reported she had, “a personal dislike for nearly all of her co-workers.”314 Weisbarth alleged
Sherwood designed a plan to fire her and that plan was put into place after Weisbarth failed to
notify her supervisors when she left town to deal with a family crisis.315 Weisbarth’s supervisor
reported when she was questioned about her failure to provide advanced notification of her
absence, Weisbarth became “emotional” and “slammed open a couple of doors as she left the
meeting.”316 As a result of her behavior, the park district ordered Weisbarth to undergo
psychological testing to determine her fitness for duty. The psychologist, hired by the park
district, found Weisbarth unfit for duty. Weisbarth then obtained a second evaluation from a
psychologist recommended by her employees’ union. The second psychologist found Weisbarth
fit for duty. The park district insisted on a third evaluation, which agreed with the first
310

Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 539.
312
Id. at 540.
313
Id.
314
Id.
315
Id.
316
Id.
311

72

psychologist’s evaluation and found Weisbarth unfit for duty. Weisbarth was terminated after
the third evaluation.317
In response to her termination, Weisbarth filed a grievance through her union.318 She
also filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging
retaliation and asserting she was terminated for her comments to Sherwood during the ride along
in violation of her First Amendment rights.319 The district court found “Garcetti did not preclude
Weisbarth’s claim,” concluding Weisbarth’s comments to Sherwood during the ride along were
not “explicitly part of her official job description as a park ranger.”320 The district court ruled,
however, Weisbarth’s speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and therefore was not
protected by the First Amendment.321 Weisbarth appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Citing Garcetti, the Sixth Circuit stated, “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes.”322 The court reasoned, “the ride along conversation between Weisbarth and
Sherwood… took place in the context of Sherwood’s official duty to interview Weisbarth” and
“that the GPD desired Sherwood to ask and Weisbarth to answer the job-related questions that
Sherwood posed.”323 The court found, “Garcetti leads us to the conclusion that such speech is
not protected under the First Amendment.”324 Weisbarth argued speaking to Sherwood was not
317
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part of her official duties as a park ranger and therefore her comments were protected under the
First Amendment.325 The Sixth Circuit disagreed reasoning Weisbarth’s obligation to comply
with Sherwood’s evaluation was an “ad-hoc duty that arose in the course of [her] duties” and
“Garcetti… implicitly recognized that such ad hoc or de facto duties can fall within the scope of
an employee’s official responsibilities despite not appearing in any written job description.”326
The Sixth Circuit cited its recent decision in Haynes v. City of Circleville in support of its
reasoning.327 In Hayes, the court “held that [a canine trainer’s] complaints about the reduction in
dog training, although obviously not part of his official written job description, occurred as part
of ‘carrying out his professional responsibilities’ of training dogs, and therefore were made
‘pursuant to his official duties.’”328 The court also considered the fact that Weisbarth’s
comments were made to a third party consultant and not directly to her employer, as had been the
case in both Garcetti and Hayes. Here, the court found, “The reasoning of Garcetti and Hayes,
however, [made] clear that the determinative factor in those cases was not where the person to
whom the employee communicated fit within the employer’s chain of command, but rather
whether the employee communicated pursuant to his or her official duties.”329 The court ruled,
“Although firing Weisbarth based on her assessment of department morale and performance [as
voiced to Sherwood] may seem highly illogical or unfair, the relevant question is whether the
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firing violated her free-speech rights under the First Amendment.”330 The Sixth Circuit held it
did not.
In Vose v. Kliment, the Seventh Circuit ruled a police sergeant’s voicing of alleged
misconduct by detectives from the major case unit was not protected under the First Amendment
because the sergeant was speaking pursuant to his official duties as the supervisor of the
narcotics unit, and not as a citizen.331 Ronald Vose had been employed as a police sergeant in
the narcotics unit of the City of Springfield Police Department for 26 years, including 13 years in
the narcotics unit. As sergeant, Vose supervised the narcotics unit. In 2004, Vose learned
detectives in the major case unit were using alleged drug investigations as a means to gather
evidence in order to have a lawful basis to obtain search warrants.332 Vose conducted his own
independent investigation of the major case unit detectives and determined the detectives were
not following the Department’s procedures for obtaining search warrants, violating laws
applicable to the search warrant process and filing false or misleading affidavits with the courts
in order to obtain search warrants.333 In the fall of 2004, Vose presented his findings to his
superiors, Donald Kliment, Chief of Police and William Rouse, Deputy Chief of Policy in charge
of the investigations unit. In November 2006, Vose notified Rouse that some detectives from the
major case unit were schedule to give testimony at a criminal trail and Vose believed “there
[might] be a problem with their testimony.”334 Vose was directed by Rouse to attend the trial
and report back any allegations of misconduct. At the trial, Vose was confronted by one of the
detectives from the major case unit and was accused of working for the defendant. Two weeks
330
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after the confrontation, Vose was served with an internal affairs complaint related to the incident
and was directed by Rouse to produce a written report about Vose’s findings of alleged
misconduct by the major case unit. Vose presented his written report to Rouse in February 2005.
The report, Vose criticized Rouse’s handling of the alleged misconduct.
Vose alleged after presenting his written findings, a number of retaliatory actions were
taken against him. Vose alleged Rouse began interfering with Vose’s operations of the narcotics
unit and in April 2005 Kliment gave Vose a directive to either, “get along” with the detectives
Vose had implicated in his independent investigation or to request a transfer out of the narcotics
unit.335 That same month, Vose presented Kliment with a memorandum requesting a transfer out
of the narcotics unit, noting he considered the transfer to be involuntary.336 In May 2005, Vose
was issued a written reprimand for the November 2004 incident with the major case unit
detective at the trial Vose had been directed to attend. In May 2005, Vose was transferred to the
patrol division. At the time, Vose found two empty boxes with his name on them outside his
office suggesting he had been “sent packing.”337 In January 2006, Vose “felt forced” to resign
from the Department, and did so that same month.338
In response to his alleged forced resignation, Vose brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois stating his First Amendment rights were violated
when Kliment and Rouse retaliated against him for voicing his concerns about the conduct of the
major case unit detectives.339 Kliment and Rouse moved to dismiss the case, claiming in light of
Garcetti, the speech rights of public employees at the time of the alleged retaliation were unclear
335
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and had since been “clarified and narrowed.”340 The district court denied their motion and ruled,
“Vose’s right to speak out on matters relating to police misconduct… was clearly established
before the events of [the] case, and Garcetti did not affect nor create this right.”341 Kliment and
Rouse appealed the ruling to the Seventh Circuit, additionally arguing Vose did not have a
constitutionally protected right to speak.
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit reviewed Garcetti and noted although the lower
court’s opinion stated police misconduct was a matter of public concern, after Garcetti the
threshold inquiry in public employee speech cases required courts to first determine whether the
employee spoke as a citizen regardless of whether or not the matter was one of public concern.342
Vose argued it was not within his official duties as supervisor of the narcotics unit to investigate
potential misconduct of officers in major crimes unit and therefore he had been speaking not as
an employee but as a citizen. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding, “Vose may have gone
above and beyond his routine duties by investigating and reporting suspected misconduct,”
however, “th[e] focus on ‘core’ job functions is too narrow after Garcetti, which asked only
whether an ‘employee’s expressions [were] made pursuant to official responsibilities.’”343 The
court reasoned, “A public employee’s more general responsibilities are not beyond the scope of
official duties for First Amendment purposes.”344 The court stated Vose himself had admitted
his own interests in the investigation stemmed from his concern the alleged misconduct could
directly affect his narcotics unit.345 As a result, the Seventh Circuit ruled, “While Vose may
340

Id.
Id.
342
Id. at 569.
343
Id. at 570.
344
Id. at 571.
345
Id. at 570.
341

77

have gone beyond his ordinary daily job duties in reporting the suspected misconduct outside his
unit, it was not beyond his official duty as a sergeant of the narcotics unit to ensure the security
and propriety of the narcotics unit’s operations.”346 Because Vose’s reporting of alleged
misconduct in the major crimes unit fell within his “more general responsibilities” as defined by
the Seventh Circuit, the appellate panel concluded his speech was not protected under the First
Amendment.347
In D’Angelo v. Sch. Bd., the Eleventh Circuit ruled a school board did not violate a
principal’s First Amendment speech rights when it terminated the principal’s employment as a
consequence for his attempts to convert his high school to a charter school.348 Michael
D’Angelo was employed by the School Board of Polk County as principal of Kathleen High
School. In the Spring of 2003 after learning his school would not receive additional resources
from the School Board, D’Angelo attended a seminar on charter schools, met with Kathleen
High School teachers, consulted with principals of other local high schools, and held two faculty
votes in an attempt to convert Kathleen High School into a charter school.349 The faculty voted
twice against charter school conversion. After the votes, D’Angelo modified his plan for full
charter conversion of Kathleen High School and pursued partial conversion instead. On May 3,
2014, D’Angelo scheduled another faculty vote on partial conversion. Before the vote could
occur, D’Angelo was summoned to the district office and terminated.350
In response to his termination, D’Angelo filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida alleging the school board had terminated him in retaliation for
346
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exercising his First Amendment speech rights.351 Relying upon Garcetti, the court concluded
D’Angelo’s attempts to convert Kathleen High School to charter status were, “part and parcel of
his official duties… done in his capacity as the principal of [the school]” and therefore not
protected by the First Amendment.352 D’Angelo appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit also considered Garcetti noting, “the Supreme Court
emphasized a public employee must speak both on a matter of public concern and as a citizen to
be protected under the First Amendment.”353 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned it had to first
determine whether D’Angelo had spoken as a citizen in his attempts to convert his school to
charter status.354 To do so, the court examined the Florida statue governing the establishment of
charter schools that stated, “An application for a conversion charter school shall be made by the
district school board, the principal, teachers, parents, and/or the school advisory council.”355
Because D’Angelo was neither a parent nor teacher, the Eleventh Circuit concluded D’Angelo’s
efforts to convert his school to charter status, “necessarily were in his capacity as the principal of
the school,” and not as a private citizen.356 The court reasoned as principal, D’Angelo was
among the limited class of individuals granted the power to convert a public school to a charter
school by state statute. Therefore it followed he must have been speaking pursuant to his job
responsibilities as principal.357 The court also noted D’Angelo “admitted that he pursued charter
351
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conversion to, ‘explore any and all possibilities to improve the quality of education at [his
school]’ which he described as part of his ‘job as a principal.’”358 Again turning to Garcetti, the
Eleventh Circuit stated, “a public employee who ‘make[s] statements pursuant to [his] official
duties… [is] not speaking as [a] citizen.’”359 Because D’Angelo spoke pursuant to his official
job duties as principal and not as a private citizen, the Eleventh Circuit found his speech was
unprotected by the First Amendment.
In Khan v. Rundle, the Eleventh Circuit ruled the First Amendment did not protect an
assistant state’s attorney in-court statements because they “owed their existence to his role as a
government lawyer.”360 Neil Khan was employed as a Miami-Dade assistant state attorney.
According to Khan, he was fired for refusing to follow his superior’s orders to also lie to a judge
by saying he was ready to go to trial when Khan believed he was not ready and to lie to a judge’s
question about the existence of a prior plea offer in a criminal case. Additionally, Khan alleged
he was terminated for telling a judge he could not deliver a plea offer because his supervisors
had been unavailable to meet with him.361 In response to his termination, Khan filed suit against
his employer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging he
was fired in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court ruled Khan’s speech
unprotected by the First Amendment because it, “was directly related to his employment
responsibilities.”362 Khan appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
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In its decision, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon Garcetti noting the Supreme Court had
concluded the “First Amendment, ‘did not invest [government employees] with a right to
perform their jobs however they see fit.’”363 Khan argued because he was expected to lie in
court as part of his official duties, when he told the truth contrary to his superior’s orders he was
speaking as a citizen and not a government employee.364 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed,
concluding Khan had misinterpreted Garcetti by lifting the word “expected” from a paragraph of
the Court’s decision focusing on the role of formal job descriptions in analyzing public employee
speech cases.365 The Eleventh Circuit stated a correct interpretation of the Garcetti required
courts to analyze, “whether the public employee was acting as an agent of the government at the
time of the relevant speech.”366 Focusing on its own interpretation of Garcetti, the Eleventh
Circuit found, “Khan’s in court statements ‘owe[d] [their] existence’ to his role as a government
lawyer. Because Khan was not speaking as a citizen but as an assistant state attorney, [his]
statements were not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.”367 The court further
concluded, “Khan’s truth-telling occurred while he was representing the state of Florida as an
assistant state attorney in open court” and “therefore [he] was speaking as a public employee and
not as a private citizen.”368 The Eleventh Circuit ruled Khan’s speech was unprotected by the
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First Amendment, concluding he was acting as an agent of the government at the time of the
relevant speech.369
In Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., the Tenth Circuit ruled a superintendent’s
reporting of irregularities in her school district’s Head Start Program to federal authorities was
not protected by the First Amendment but the reporting of her school board’s Open Meetings Act
violations may have been protected.370 Barbara Casey was superintendent of the West Las
Vegas Independent School District. As superintendent, Casey was responsible for the school
district’s federally funded Head Start program. During her tenure, Casey discovered as many as
50% of the families enrolled in the Head Start program had either intentionally omitted family
income information or inflated the size of their family in order to qualify for the program. 371
Casey reported her findings to her school board on several occasions but was told to ignore her
findings. Concerned with her board’s failure to act, Casey instructed a subordinate to report her
findings to federal authorities. During the same school year, Casey informed the Board they
were violating the New Mexico Open Meetings Act by making personnel and other decisions in
executive session. When the Board ignored her warnings, Casey filed a written complaint with
the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office. The Attorney General’s Office responded in writing
to the school board president, enclosed a copy of Casey’s complaint and requested a response.372
Shortly thereafter, the school board demoted Casey to Assistant Superintendent and decided not
to renew her contract for the following school year, effectively terminating her employment as
superintendent. In response to her termination, Casey filed suit in the United States District
369
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Court for the District of New Mexico alleging retaliation for exercising her First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.373
In its decision, the Tenth Circuit noted Garcetti, “significantly modified” the first prong
of the Pickering analysis and, “obligated [the court] to ask whether Ms. Casey met her burden [of
meeting the threshold inquiry outlined in Garcetti] by providing evidence her expressions were
made in her capacity as a citizen and not pursuant to her ‘official duties.’”374 According to the
court, Casey’s comments regarding the Head Start program were of two types – those statements
directed to the School Board about the program and her directive to a subordinate to report
findings to federal officials. Analyzing Casey’s statements made to the School Board, the court
found it was within Casey’s responsibilities as superintendent to advise the School Board on,
“the lawful and proper way to conduct school business,” and therefore her comments regarding
the Head Start program were, “made pursuant to her official duties,” as superintendent and
unprotected under the First Amendment.375
Examining Casey’s directive to a subordinate to report irregularities in the Head Start
program to federal authorities, the court noted Casey had not advised the School Board of her
directive, “but instead went very much around them,” in doing so.376 The court stated, “the
question before [it] [was] whether, in doing so, Ms. Casey used [a subordinate] as her agent to
engage in protected citizen whistleblowing, or whether Ms. Casey acted pursuant to her official
duties in ordering a subordinate to report the District’s regulatory noncompliance to federal
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authorities.”377 The court noted during a deposition, Casey “effectively acknowledged” her
responsibilities to report the irregularities in the Head Start program to federal authorities
because she “would be held legally responsible for having knowledge of something that was
wrong and not reporting [it].”378 The court concluded Casey’s directive to report illustrated, “an
individual striving diligently to fulfill a federal regulatory obligation directly bearing on her by
virtue of the office she held,” and “deemed it appropriate to order a subordinate… to contact
Head Start officials.”379 However, the court ruled Casey’s actions were taken pursuant to her
official position as superintendent and unprotected by the First Amendment.
The court next considered Casey’s complaint filed with the New Mexico Attorney
General’s Office regarding the school board’s repeated Open Meetings Act violations. The court
stated it had no evidence the Board or any other legal authority assigned Casey the responsibility
for policing the School Board’s meeting practices.380 The court stated the evidence before it
suggested board members held the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Open
Meetings Act and concluded, “Ms. Casey’s conduct fell sufficiently outside the scope of her
office to survive even the force of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti.”381 In so finding,
the court remanded the matter back to the District Court for further proceedings.
In Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy, the Tenth Circuit ruled a teachers’
comments regarding student behavior, curriculum and pedagogy, spending on instructional aids,
furniture, and classroom computers were unprotected by the First Amendment but statements
made regarding potential illegal actions by their school’s board of directors and statements
377
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referring to upcoming board of director elections were protected.382 Jody Brammer-Hoelter,
Laura Kilduff, Melissa Perry, Amy Sulzbach, Shelley Crews and Bonnie Gould (“the teachers”)
were employed at Twin Peaks Charter Academy (“the Academy”) within the boundaries of the
St. Vrain Valley School District in Longmont, Colorado. During their employment at the
Academy, the teachers developed a number of concerns or grievances about the Academy’s
operation, management and mission.383 The teachers began meeting off campus to discuss their
concerns. Parents and other community members attended some of these meetings.
Upon learning about the meetings, the Academy’s principal, Dr. Dorothy Marlatt,
directed the teachers not to discuss issues regarding the Academy outside of work in order to
maintain personnel and student confidentiality.384 Ignoring Dr. Marlatt’s directive, the teachers
continued to meet and made their concerns and grievances known to the Twin Peaks Academy
Board of Directors both orally and in writing. After making their concerns and grievances
known, the teachers contended they received less favorable performance reviews from Dr.
Marlatt.385 The teachers also alleged Dr. Marlatt began ignoring them and created what they
believed to be a hostile work environment. Sometime thereafter, the teachers submitted letters of
resignation to the Academy Board of Directors. At the time the Board met to discuss the
resignations, Dr. Marlatt presented the Board with her own letter of resignation. Upon learning
of Dr. Marlatt’s resignation, the teachers attempted to rescind their resignations. The Board
refused to rescind the teachers’ resignations. In response to the Board’s refusal, the teachers
filed a grievance alleging the Board acted in bad faith. The grievance was denied. All but one
382
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teacher reapplied for teaching positions at the Academy. After the Board refused to rehire them,
the teachers filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging
they were retaliated against for exercising their First Amendment speech rights.386 The district
court ruled the matters discussed by the teachers were not matters of public concern and the
teachers failed to show they had suffered an adverse employment action as a result of their
speech.387 The teachers appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
In analyzing the facts of the case, the Tenth Circuit stated in light of Garcetti, “it [was]
apparent that the ‘Pickering’ analysis of freedom of speech retaliation claims [was] a five step
inquiry which [the court] now [referred] to as the ‘Garcetti/Pickering’ analysis.”388 Outlining
the steps of its Garcetti/Pickering analysis, the court stated the first step of the analysis was to
determine whether or not the employee spoke pursuant to their official duties. Focusing on this
first step of the analysis, the court turned to Garcetti to define speech pursuant to an employee’s
official duties. Interpreting Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit concluded, “speech may be made
pursuant to an employee’s official duties even if it deals with activities that the employee is not
expressly required to perform.”389 Further, the court noted, “if an employee engages in speech
during the course of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to or
facilitates the employee’s performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the
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employee’s official duties.”390 Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded by entering
into employment contracts with the Academy, the teachers agreed to, “support the philosophy
and curriculum of the Academy without reservation.”391 The court ruled as contractual
employees, “nearly all matters [the teachers] discussed were made pursuant to their duties as
teachers….. and could be freely regulated by the Academy.”392 Those comments regarding
matters made pursuant to their duties as teachers were unprotected by the First Amendment and
required no further consideration as outlined in the court’s Pickering/Garcetti five step analysis.
The Eleventh Circuit did find, however, some of the matters discussed by the teachers
were not made pursuant to their official duties and did require further consideration under the
court’s Pickering/Garcetti analysis. As a result, the court turned to the second step of the
analysis to determine whether or not those matters unrelated to the teachers’ official duties
touched on matters of public concern. The court found matters discussed by the teachers
regarding “potential illegal conduct by [the Board] [was] inherently a matter of public concern,”
as was, “political speech regarding upcoming Board elections.”393 Continuing with its
Pickering/Garcetti analysis, the third step required the court to next balance the teachers’ free
speech rights with the Board’s interest in maintaining an efficient and disciplined work
environment.”394 Here the court noted the Board, “made no argument regarding their interest as
employers either in their motion for summary judgment or in their appellate brief.”395 As a
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result, the Tenth Circuit ruled the teachers’ free speech rights on these two specific matters
outweighed the Board’s interest in maintaining the efficient operation of the Academy.
Finding the teachers’ free speech rights outweighed the Board’s interest in maintaining
the efficient operation of the Academy, the court applied the fourth step of the analysis to
determine whether the teachers’ speech was a, “substantial factor or a motivating factor in [a]
detrimental employment decision.”396 Again turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded
Dr. Marlott’s “surly” attitude toward the teachers and the teachers’ poor performance evaluations
were examples of adverse employment actions resulting from the teachers’ protected speech.397
The court then applied the final step of its Pickering/Garcetti analysis to determine if the Board
would have taken the same action against the teachers even in the absence of their protected
speech. The Tenth Circuit found the Board provided no alternative reasons or evidence other
than the teachers’ protected speech for the adverse employment actions.398

2008

In Davis v. Cook County, the Seventh Circuit ruled a registered nurse’s memo describing
concerns she had with the operation of the emergency room were not constitutionally protected
because the memo was written pursuant to the nurse’s duties as a public employee.399 Tonya
Davis was employed as a registered nurse and assigned to the Emergency Room at Stroger
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Hospital of Cook County, Illinois.400 Within a sixth month span, Davis had several unpleasant
encounters with various hospital employees, the last of which was with Nursing Coordinator
Clanton.401 Clanton directed Davis to change a patient’s sheets, a directive Davis ignored
because she felt completing patient assessments was more important.402 After the encounter,
Davis sent a memo to several hospital officials complaining she was being “harassed and
abused.”403 Davis’ direct supervisor, Cynthia Przislicki, investigated the allegations and became
concerned about Davis’ behavior and ordered Davis to submit to a fitness-for-duty
examination.404 Davis refused and filed a union grievance.405 Several weeks later, Davis
received an apology, was allowed to return to work and given back pay for work missed.406
Thereafter, Davis file suit against her employer in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division alleging in part the violation of her First
Amendment rights.407 The district court found the subject matter contained in Davis’ memo
“utterly insufficient” to be protected by the First Amendment.408 Davis appealed the ruling to the
Seventh Circuit.409
Citing Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit stated the threshold inquiry in the case was whether
the Davis memo was, “something done pursuant to [her] professional duties.”410 According to
the court, Davis admitted during trial the memo’s subject matter contained related to the
400

Id. at 651.
Id.
402
Id.
403
Id. at 652.
404
Id.
405
Id.
406
Id.
407
Id. at 651.
408
Id. at 652.
409
Id.
410
Id. at 653. Citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
401

89

operation of the hospital’s ER.411 Examining the memo the court found, “the memo reflect[ed]
the concern of the conscientious nurse to ensure and contribution to the smooth functioning of
the ER and to advocate for the well-being of the patients under her care.”412 The court next
considered the job description of a registered ER nurse, finding an ER registered nurse’s job
responsibilities included taking care of the patients, expediting patients through the system and
acting as an advocate on behalf of patients.”413 Considering the responsibilities outlined in the
job description, the court reasoned the issues “discuss[ed] in the memo concern[ed] particular job
responsibilities of a registered nurse.”414 As a result, the court held Davis’ speech was not
protected by the First Amendment because her job arguably addressed her work responsibilities
as a registered nurse. As a result, the court held Davis speech was not protected by the First
Amendment because her speech arguably addressed her work responsibilities.415

2009

In Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit held a California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation correction officer’s internal reports to her supervisors regarding inmate sexual
misconduct were not protected under the First Amendment but her communications to a state
senator and inspector general were protected.416 Deanna Freitag was employed as a correctional
officer with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at Pelican Bay
411
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State Prison (Pelican Bay). In September 1998, Freitag witnessed an inmate standing naked in
the exercise yard masturbating. In response, Freitag directed the inmate to return to his cell. The
inmate responded by ripping a temperature gauge off a wall and screaming sexually derogatory
obscenities and threatening to kill Freitag.417 Freitag’s supervisor directed her not to document
the incident. However, she nevertheless did by completing a disciplinary report charging the
inmate with threatening a public official. In late 1998 and early 1999, Freitag reported several
additional incidents of inmate masturbation. After she reported another instance of inappropriate
sexual behavior by an inmate in February 1999, Freitag’s supervising captain, Lieutenant David
Carmichael, discarded Freitag’s written report and informed Freitag, “she was the only officer
who had a problem with [the particular inmate] and ‘it’s only sex.’”418 In March 1999, Freitag
reported another instance of inmate inappropriate sexual behavior. During a disciplinary
hearing, that inmate was given a lessor punishment for his inappropriate behavior because of
prison administration’s delay in processing the paperwork.
That same month, Freitag sent a memorandum to Barry O’Neill, David Carmichael’s
supervisor and Robert Ayers, warden at Pelican Bay, “complaining that her reports of inmate
misbehavior were being ‘denied or thrown away,’ thus causing her, ‘authority and discretion [to
be] undermined.’”419 In April 1999, Freitag sent a letter to Teresa Schwartz, associate warden in
charge of Freitag’s unit, “complaining that her supervisors were ‘procrastinating’ in responding
to the sexually abusive behavior of inmates” stating, “For the supervisor’s calloused exchange of
me, and other female staff, as a sexual favor to gain [inmates] cooperation, I should be
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recompensed for my injury.”420 That same month, Freitag wrote another letter to Cal Terhune,
Director of the CDCR, alleging an inmate was creating a hostile work environment and her
supervisors had failed to respond to her allegations. Days later, Freitag was relieved of her duty
pending a psychiatric evaluation prompted by what her supervisors described as her “incoherent”
memoranda regarding inmate harassment.421 She was returned to duty after the evaluation
deemed her fit for duty.
In July 1999, Ayers initiated an internal affairs (IA) investigation of Freitag for purported
factual inaccuracies in Freitag’s memorandum regarding a July incident of inmate misconduct.
Ayers initiated a second IA investigation against Freitag in August 1999, alleging Freitag had
made “slanderous accusations against other staff.”422 Following the August IA investigation,
Freitag filed a formal complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH), alleging sexual harassment by inmates at Pelican Bay, her supervisors’ lack of
response to reported harassment and retaliation by supervisors for her complaints.423 After an
investigation by DFEH, Freitag’s allegations were found to be unsubstantiated.
In August 1999, Freitag sent a letter to California State Senator Richard Polanco, alleging
she and other female corrections officers were regularly subjected to sexually abusive behavior
and that supervisors had failed to respond. Freitag sent a follow up letter to Polanco in
September 1999, this time copying CDCR Director Terhune. In response to her letters, Polanco
contacted the California Office of the Inspector General (IG), requesting an investigation into the
allegations. In January and February 1999, while the IG’s investigation ensued, Frietag received
420
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two notices of adverse action from Schwartz alleging wrongdoing by Freitag.424 Shortly
thereafter, Freitag was terminated prior to the issuance of the IG’s report.425
In response to her termination, Freitag filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California alleging in part retaliation for exercising her First Amendment
right to free speech. The jury ruled in favor of Freitag.426 The district judge’s instructions to the
jury included Freitag’s internal communications with her employer as an example of free
speech.427 Her communications with Senator Polanco and cooperation with the IG’s
investigation were also provided as examples of free speech.428 Freitag’s employers appealed to
the Ninth Circuit arguing under Garcetti, Freitag had not spoken as a citizen and therefore her
speech was not protected.
The Ninth Circuit examined both Freitag’s internal memos regarding inmate sexual
misconduct and her external communications to Senator Polanco and the California IG’s office.
According to the court, the critical inquiry was whether Freitag had spoken pursuant to her
official duties as a corrections officer.429 In regards to Freitag’s internal communications, the
court concluded, “it [was] clear” under Garcetti her internal memos regarding inmate sexual
misconduct were not constitutionally protected because Freitag, “submitted those reports
424
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pursuant to her official duties as a corrections officer.”430 The court did not elaborate on how
they drew this conclusion. Finding the district court judge’s jury instructions stated Freitag’s
internal memos were protected, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court the question of
whether the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the unprotected speech not been
included.431
The Ninth Circuit concluded, “Under [Garcetti], Freitag [did] not lose her right to speak
as a citizen simply because she initiated the communications while at work or because they
concerned the subject matter of her employment.”432 With respect to Freitag’s letters to Senator
Polanco and her cooperation with the IG, the court ruled, “it was certainly not part of her official
tasks to complain to the Senator or the IG about the state’s failure to perform its duties properly,
and specifically its failure to take corrective action,” but rather, “it was [her] responsibility as a
citizen to expose… official malfeasance to broader scrutiny.”433 The court concluded Freitag’s,
“right to complain both to an elected public official and to an independent state agency [was]
guaranteed to any citizen in a democratic society regardless of [her] status as a public
employee.”434 Because a relevant citizen analogue to the speech in question existed, the Ninth
Circuit found Freitag’s external communications to Senator Polanco and her cooperation with the
IG’s investigation were protected speech.
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2010

The Second Circuit clearly laid out its framework for considering public employee
speech in Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.435 In Weintraub, the court considered three factors in
determining whether or not a public employee’s speech was protected by the First Amendment.
These factors included: whether the employee’s speech was made “in furtherance” of the
employee’s official duties; whether “a relevant analogue to citizen speech” exists; and whether
complaints and concerns expressed by the employee were made to superiors “up the chain of
command.”436
In 1998, David Weintraub was employed by the Board of Education of the City School
District of the City of New York (“Board”) as a fifth grade teacher at P.S. 274 in Brooklyn. In
November 1998, Weintraub referred a student to the school’s assistant principal, Douglas
Goodman, after the student threw a book at Weintraub during class. Goodman returned the
student to class and the next day the same student again threw books at Weintraub. Again,
Weintraub referred the student to Goodman who in turn again returned the student to class.
Upset with Goodman’s decision not to discipline the student, Weintraub told Goodman, “If
nothing is going to be done, [Weintraub] [would] file a grievance with the union to have
something done about this…”437 Weintraub told other teachers about the incident and
subsequently filed a grievance with the union. Weintraub alleged in response to his grievance,
Goodman and other school officials retaliated against him by giving him unfounded negative
classroom evaluations, performance reviews, and disciplinary reports; wrongfully accusing him
435
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of sexually abusing a student and abandoning his class; having him arrested for on false grounds
for misdemeanor attempted assault of another teacher; and ultimately wrongfully terminating his
employment.438
In response to his termination, Weintraub filed suit against his employer in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging adverse employment
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. In April 2006, the district court found in favor
of Weintraub observing, “the content of speech questioning an administrative response, or lack
thereof, to discipline problems in the classroom relates to a matter of public concern…”439
Relying upon Garcetti, the district court granted a motion to reconsider. The district court
acknowledged its belief that, “a substantial ground for difference of opinion [existed] on” the
precise issue of “whether a public employee acts as an ‘employee,’ and not as a ‘citizen,’ when
he notifies his supervisors, either formally or informally, of an issue regarding the safety of his
workplace that touches upon a matter of public concern, as well as on the employee’s own
private interest.”440 Relying on Garcetti, the district court ruled against Weintraub but
encouraged him to file an interlocutory appeal, “on the basis the case involved a controlling
question of law for which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion.”441 Weintraub’s
interlocutory appeal was granted by the Second Circuit.
In its ruling, the Second Circuit expanded upon the Supreme Court’s definition of speech
made pursuant to a public employee’s job duties as outlined in Garcetti by adding “speech that
government employers have not expressly required may still be made pursuant to the employee’s
438
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official duties, “so long as the speech is in furtherance of such duties.”442 Applying this expanded
definition, the Second Circuit concluded Weintraub’s grievance was “made ‘pursuant to’ his
official duties because it was ‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly
execute his duties’ as a public school teacher – namely, to maintain classroom discipline.”443
The Second Circuit next turned to examining whether a “relevant citizen analogue” to the
Weintraub’s speech existed.444 In Garcetti, the Supreme Court ruled, “a public employee speaks
pursuant to employment responsibilities [when] there is no relevant analogue to speech by
citizens who are not government employees.”445 Examining whether Weintraub’s speech had a
relevant citizen analogue, the Second Circuit ruled, “the lodging of a union grievance is not a
form or channel of discourse available to non-employee citizens.”446 The court further
concluded Weintraub had not voiced his concerns through “channels available to citizens
generally,” but rather through “internal communication pursuant to an existing dispute-resolution
policy established by [the teacher’s] employer, the Board of Education.”447 Because citizens
lack access to a formal grievance process afforded Weintraub as an employee of the Board of
Education, the Second Circuit ruled his speech was unprotected under the First Amendment.
The last factor considered by the Second Circuit was whether Weintraub’s complaints and
concerns were expressed to the teacher’s superiors “up the chain of command.”448 The Second
Circuit ruled when an employee expresses complaints and concerns to supervisors “up the chain
of command at his workplace,” the employee’s speech is unprotected because it is made pursuant
442
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to his official duties.449 Because Weintraub’s grievance was made in furtherance of his official
duties as a teacher; filed in a manner and forum unavailable to private citizens; and presented to
his superiors up the chain of command within the public school system, the Second Circuit ruled
his speech was unprotected by the First Amendment because a relevant citizen analogue did not
exist.450
In Fox v. Traverse City Sch. Bd., the Sixth Circuit ruled a special education teacher’s
complaints about class size were unprotected by the First Amendment.451 Susan Fox was
employed as an elementary special education teacher with the Traverse City Are Public Schools.
During that time, Fox volunteered to participate in a reading program designed to improve the
reading skills of both general and special education students.452 While participating in the
reading program, Fox alleged her caseload reached 34 students, over the legally required
maximum of 21 students.453 She voiced her concern about her caseload to the principal of the
building and the school district’s special education director.454 Fox acknowledged she never
filed a formal grievance with her union and her building principal disputed Fox ever complained
that her caseload violated the law.455
During this time, numerous deficiencies were noted in Fox’s performance including
failure to complete the required student Medicaid and IEP reports in an appropriate and timely
manner, the unauthorized delegation of responsibilities to teaching assistants, and the failure to
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provide the minimum required instructional time for students.456 Fox’s performance evaluations
noted complaints from parents as well.457 She was ultimately relieved of her duties in the
volunteer reading program for allegedly falling behind in her other duties.458 Fox alleged she
encountered hostility that ultimately led to the non-renewal of her contract.459 Following the
non-renewal of her contract, Fox filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan alleging retaliation in violation of her First Amendment right to express her
concerns regarding her caseload.460 The district court held, “the speech in question… was made
not in her role as a ‘public citizen’ but as an employee, that it was made to her immediate
supervisors, and that it did not address a matter of ‘public concern’ but, rather, only the
conditions of her employment.”461 The district court concluded Fox’s speech was unprotected by
the First Amendment. Fox appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
Citing Weisbarth, the Sixth Circuit stated, “For a public employee’s statements to receive
First Amendment protection, the public employee must speak ‘as a citizen’ and ‘address matters
of public concern.”’462 The court stated, “Under Garcetti, even employee speech addressing a
matter of public concern is not protected if made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”463
Taking into consideration the court’s own decision in Weisbarth and the Supreme Court’s
Garcetti decision, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, “in reviewing a public employee’s statements
under Garcetti, we must consider both its content and context – including to whom the statement
456
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was made – to determine whether the plaintiff made the statement pursuant to her individual
duties.”464 The court also noted, “speech by a public employee made pursuant to ad hoc or de
facto duties not appearing in any written job description is nevertheless not protected if it ‘owes
its existence to [the speaker’s] professional responsibilities.’”465 Looking at the specific facts of
the case, the court noted, “Fox’s complaints were directed solely to her supervisor, not to the
general public.”

2011

In Jackler v. Byrne,466 the Second Circuit held the existence of a relevant civilian
analogue for an employee’s speech entitled the speech to First Amendment protection, despite
the fact the employee spoke pursuant to his official duties as well.467 Jason Jackler was
employed as a probationary police officer with the Middletown Police Department (MPD). On
January 5, 2006, Jackler responded to a call to assist a fellow MPD officer, Sergeant Gregory
Metakes, arrest and transport a suspect, Zachary Jones.468 At the scene, Jackler witnessed
Metakes open the rear door of his patrol car and strike the handcuffed Jones in the face after
Jones called Metakes a “dick.”469 At the police station, MPD desk officer, Sal Garetto,
questioned Jones about a large bump on Jones’s head and abrasions to his face.470 Jones
indicated Metakes smashed his head into the ground and punched him during the arrest. The
464
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next night, Jones filed a civilian complaint against Metakes for the use of excessive force during
his arrest.471 In response to Jones’s civilian complaint, MPD Lieutenant Patrick Freeman
ordered Jackler to file a supplementary report detailing the events of January 5.472 Jackler’s
report corroborated Jones’s civilian complaint regarding Jones allegation that he was struck in
the face.473
On January 11, Freeman and Lieutenant Paul Rickard met with Jackler and attempted to,
“coerce” Jackler to withdraw his supplemental report and refile a new report… in an effort to
conceal the illegal actions and misconduct of Sgt. Metakes.”474 These attempts were repeated in
several subsequent meetings but Jackler refused.475 On January 19, Police Chief Matthew Bryne
and Rickard appeared at a monthly meeting of the Board of Police Commissioners and
recommended Jackler be terminated as a probationary officer, to which the Commissioners
agreed.476 In response to his termination, Jackler filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York alleging in part retaliation for his “refusal to cooperate with
[his MPD supervisors] and commit a criminal act by altering or falsifying his supplemental
report” in violation of his First Amendment rights.477 Applying Garcetti and the Second
Circuit’s recent decision in Weintraub, the district court ruled Jackler’s speech was made in his
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capacity as a police officer and not a citizen and therefore unprotected by the First
Amendment.478 Jackler appealed to the Second Circuit.
In its decision, the Second Circuit created a significant exception to Garcetti.479 The
court reasoned, “Whereas the plaintiff in Garcetti had been fired for engaging in speech that was
required as part of his job, Jackler’s First Amendment claims were based not on his [written
report of Metakes’ excessive force], but only on his subsequent refusals to commit a blatantly
wrongful – if not criminal – act.”480 Jackler argued he had a First Amendment right as a private
citizen to refuse to falsify his official report.481 The court agreed. The court found, “a citizen
has a First Amendment right to decide what to say and what not to say, and, accordingly, the
right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make statements he believes are false.”482
The court reasoned, “Of course a police officer has a duty not to substitute a falsehood for the
truth, i.e., a duty to tell ‘nothing but the truth’; but he plainly has that duty as a citizen as
well.”483 The court ruled, “Jackler’s refusal to comply with orders to retract his truthful Report
and file one that was false has a clear civilian analogue and that Jackler was not simply doing his
job in refusing to obey those orders from the [MPD’s] top administrative officers and the chief of
police.”484 According to the Second Circuit, “the existence of a relevant civilian analogue for
Jackler’s speech triggered First Amendment protection despite the fact that he spoke pursuant to
his official duties.”485 The Second Circuit’s Jackler decision was a departure from previous
478
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cases relying on Garcetti because the Second Circuit did not conclude Jackler’s speech was
unprotected simply because he spoke pursuant to his official duties as a police officer.486
In Bowie v. Maddox, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed
with the Second Circuit’s Jackler decision when it ruled an inspector general’s refusal to sign an
affidavit his employer drafted for him in response to a former subordinate’s employment
discrimination claim was not protected by the First Amendment.487 David Bowie was employed
by the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General (“OIC”) as an Assistant Inspector
General for Investigations.488 In February 2000, Bowie participated in a meeting with his
supervisor, Alfred Miller, regarding the unsatisfactory job performance of another OIG
employee, Emanuel Johnson.489 Although remedial measures were considered, it was ultimately
decided Johnson be terminated; a decision with which Bowie did not agree.490 In response to his
termination, Johnson filed a discrimination complaint, alleging wrongful termination. Gail
Davis, Deputy Attorney General for the OIG drafted a position statement in response to the
discrimination complaint as well as an affidavit regarding the February meeting Bowie had
attended.491 Dissatisfied with the accuracy of Davis’s affidavit, Bowie refused to sign the
document and prepared his own affidavit critical of OIG’s decision to terminate Johnson and
submitted it to the OIG’s general counsel.492 Bowie then testified for Johnson in his wrongful
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termination suit against the OIG.493 As a result of his actions, Bowie was terminated. In
response to his termination, Bowie filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging he was retaliated against in violation of his First Amendment rights.494 The
district court ruled against Bowie finding his speech was made, “pursuant to his official duties”
and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment.495 Bowie appealed the district court’s ruling
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In his appeal, Bowie argued his speech was protected by the First Amendment because, it
[was] analogous to the speech of private citizens who submit testimony...”496 The circuit court
disagreed. The D.C. Circuit acknowledged, “Bowie’s argument… finds support” in the Second
Circuit’s opinion in Jackler.497 In Jackler, the Second Circuit, “concluded Jackler’s refusal to
obey [his employer’s] instructions… is not beyond the scope of the First Amendment.”498
Because a citizen analogue existed, the Second Circuit concluded Jackler’s speech was protected
by the First Amendment even though he spoke pursuant to his official duties.499 However, the
D.C. Circuit concluded, the Second Circuit had misinterpreted Garcetti in Jackler. The D.C.
Circuit reasoned, “A test that allows a First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed whenever
the government employee can identify a civilian analogue for his speech is about as useful as a
mosquito net made of chicken wire.”500 The court said, “All official speech, viewed at a
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sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue.”501 The court ruled, “An utterance made
‘pursuant to employment responsibilities’ is unprotected even if the same utterance would be
protected were the employee to communicate it ‘as a citizen.’”502 Because Bowie spoke
pursuant to his official duties, regardless of the potential existence of a civilian analogue, the
D.C. Circuit concluded his speech was unprotected by the First Amendment.

2012

In Massaro v. Dep’t of Educ. of N.Y., the Second Circuit ruled a teacher’s complaints
about alleged unsanitary conditions in her classroom were not protected by the First Amendment.
Yvonne Massaro was employed as a public school teacher with the New York City Department
of Education (“DOE”).503 Massaro claimed to school administrators she had contracted scabies
from what she alleged to be unsanitary conditions in her classroom.504 Massuro filed a
Comprehensive Injury Report, claiming she had been bitten by mites in her classroom.505
Massaro also filed an Accident Report, in which she described her classroom as an “unclean
working environment,” and sought reimbursement expenses related to her scabies infection.506
During this time, Massaro also complained verbally to school administrators about these
issues.507 In response to her complaints, Massaro alleged school administrators retaliated against
her by rescheduling her classes so she had to walk up more stairs than before, placed large
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numbers of special education students in one of her classes, either failed to provide adequate
supplies or delayed the receipt of adequate supplies for her classes, and subjected her to
increased scrutiny by her peers as to whether she was present in her classroom on time.508
Massaro brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
alleging in part school administrators retaliated against her in violation of her First Amendment
rights. The district court found in favor of the DOE ruling, “Massaro’s complaints regarding her
health issues and the allegedly unsanitary conditions in her classroom did not constitute
constitutionally protected speech because Massaro spoke as an employee rather than a private
citizen.”509 Massaro appealed to the Second Circuit.
It its opinion, the Second Circuit stated the question before the court was whether
Massaro spoke as an employee pursuant to her official duties or as a private citizen on a matter
of public concern.510 Citing its earlier decision in Weintraub, the court concluded employee
speech may be considered to be unprotected if made pursuant to a public employee’s official
duties and if it was “part-and-parcel” of the employee’s “ability to properly execute [their]
duties.”511 The court also acknowledged, “The ‘lack of a citizen analogue’ to the form of [an
employee’s] speech also ‘bear[s] on… whether the public employee is speaking as a citizen.’”512
Turning to the facts of the case, the court concluded Massaro’s complaints, “concerned her
ability ‘to properly execute [her] duties’ as a public school teacher because they were aimed at
resolving her health issues so that she could continue to teach, and ensuring she had a safe and
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clean environment in which to work and that her use of sick days [were] properly credited.”513
The court also found, “Massaro spoke as an employee rather than a private citizen… [because]
she aired her complaints only to several school administrators rather than to the public, and that
most of those complaints were made in the context of internal safety and medical absence-related
forms (as least one of which was marked “confidential”), for which there was no relevant citizen
analogue.514 Because Massaro’s complaints were “part-and-parcel” of her “ability to properly
execute her duties” and her complaints were logged in such a manner as precluding civilian
analogue, the Second Circuit ruled her speech was unprotected by the First Amendment.515
In Ross v. Breslin, the Second Circuit held a school district payroll employee’s report of
alleged financial malfeasance was not protected by the First Amendment.516 Risa Ross was
employed as a payroll clerk typist for the Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free School District (the
“District”). Over a period of three years, Ross informed District Superintendent Robert
Lichtenfeld of several alleged improprieties, including forgery, unauthorized bonuses and
improper payments.517 Ross also brought her allegations to Renee Gargano, an outside
consultant brought in by the District. Gargano was also serving as Deputy Superintendent at a
neighboring school district at that same time.518 Gargano informed Lichtenfeld that Ross had
previously worked and been terminated from employment in Gargano’s school district and that
Ross had failed to record her employment at the neighboring school district on her employment
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application with Katonah-Lewisboro.519 Thereafter, Lichtenfeld suspended Ross with pay.520
During her suspension, Ross wrote a letter on her personal stationary to each of the board
members outlining the concerns she shared with Lichtenfeld and expressing her “complete
frustration with the District’s administration.”521 After receiving a copy of the letter, Lichtenfeld
recommended and the Board agreed to terminate Ross.522 Ross filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging in part her termination was a
violation of her First Amendment right to free speech.523 The district court ruled in Ross’s favor
finding Ross presented sufficient evidence Lichtenfeld violated her First Amendment rights.524
The district court found Ross’s statements to Gargano about improper payments and promotions
were not protected by the First Amendment because they were “in the nature of an employee
grievance,” but her statements to Lichtenfeld and her letter to the Board were protected by the
First Amendment because, “she was speaking on a matter of public concern, she went outside the
chain of command, and her complaints were not in the nature of an employee grievance.”525
Lichtenfeld appealed the case to the Second Circuit. The question before the Second Circuit was
whether Ross’s speech was made pursuant to her official duties as the school district’s payroll
clerk typist.526
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The Second Circuit stated observed, “The inquiry into whether an employee’s speech was
made pursuant to her official duties is not susceptible to a bright-line rule.”527 Citing Weintraub,
the court went on to clarify, “courts must examine the nature of the plaintiff’s job
responsibilities, the nature of the speech, and the relationship between the two.”528 The court
reasoned, “Other contextual factors, such as whether the complaint was also conveyed to the
public, may properly influence a court’s decision.”529 Examining Ross’s testimony to the district
court, the Sixth Circuit found Ross, “admitted that her responsibilities included reporting
mistakes to supervisors,” and, “[Ross] acquired all of the information she relayed to Lichtenfeld
in the ordinary course of performing her work.”530 According to the court, Ross’s reports to
Lichtenfeld were, “part and parcel of her official responsibilities.”531 In response to the district
court’s finding that Ross went outside the chain of command to express her concerns to
Lichtenfeld and the Board, the Sixth Circuit concluded Ross brought her concerns to Lichtenfeld
because she felt her concerns were not being addressed by her immediate supervisor. When
Ross felt Lichtenfeld was not addressing her concerns, she brought them to the Board. The court
reasoned, “Taking a complaint up the chain of command to find someone who will take it
seriously ‘does not, without more, transform [her] speech into protected speech made as a private
citizen.’”532 Because Ross’s speech, “owed its existence to her job duties” and her concerns
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were expressed up the chain of command within the school district, the Sixth Circuit ruled her
speech was unprotected by the First Amendment.533

2013

In Lane v. Franks, the Eleventh Circuit ruled the First Amendment did not protect a
community college administrator’s subpoenaed testimony about possible fraud involving an
elected official.534 Edward Lane was employed in a probationary position as Director of Central
Alabama Community College’s (“CACC”) Intensive Training for Youth Program (“CITY”).535
As director, Lane performed a financial audit of CITY and discovered then-state representative
Suzanne Schmitz was on CITY’s payroll but was, “not reporting for work and had not otherwise
performed any tangible work for the program.”536 Despite warnings from CACC’s president,
Dave Franks and lawyer, Lane terminated Schmitz’s employment with CITY.537 Soon after
Schmitz’s termination, the FBI began investigating the representative. Schmitz was accused of
mail fraud and fraud involving a program receiving federal funds. Lane testified before a grand
jury and pursuant to a subpoena in federal court that Schmitz had not reported to work or
submitted time sheets for work, refused to report to work at CITY’s offices as instructed by
Lane, and confessed to Lane that she had gotten her job through connections with the Executive
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Secretary of the Alabama Education Association.538 Later that same year, Franks sent Lane and
29 other CITY employees with less than 3 years of service a termination letter citing budget cuts
as the reason.539 A few days later after allegedly discovering most of the employees receiving
the letters were not actually probationary employees; Franks rescinded all but two termination
letters. Lane’s termination letter was not rescinded.540 In response to his termination, Lane filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleging Franks
terminated Lane in retaliation for testifying against Schmitz, in violation of his First Amendment
rights.541 The district court ruled Lane’s speech was made pursuant to his official duties as
CITY’s Director and not as a citizen on a matter of public concern.542 Lane appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit.
Citing its previous decision in Abdur-Rahman v. Walker, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “In
determining whether a government employee’s statement is protected by the First Amendment,
‘we look to the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record.’”543 Stating Lane’s comments in question were made in the context of subpoenaed
testimony, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged its earlier decision in Morris v. Crow was
controlling precedent.544 In Morris, the court held a police officer’s speech consisting of a
written accident report and his subpoenaed testimony regarding the accident report were not
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protected by the First Amendment.545 In Morris, the court stated, “The mere fact that Morris’s
statements were made in the context of a civil deposition cannot transform them into
constitutionally protected speech.”546 Turning to the facts of the case before them, the court
found no one disputed Lane was acting pursuant to his official duties when he investigated
Schmitz’s work activities, spoke with Schmitz and other CACC officials about her employment,
and ultimately fired her.547 The court reasoned, “Lane testified about his official activities
pursuant to a subpoena and in the litigation context, in and of itself, [did] not bring Lane’s
speech within the protection of the First Amendment.”548 The court ruled, “Nothing evidences
that Lane testified at Schmitz’s trial ‘primarily in [his] role as citizen’ or that his testimony was
an attempt to comment publicly on CITY’s internal operations.”549 Because Lane was speaking
pursuant to his official duties as director of CITY when giving testimony about Schmitz, the
court ruled his speech was unprotected by the First Amendment.550
In Lane, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged a split among the circuit courts existed in
adjudicating public employee speech cases involving subpoenaed testimony. The Eleventh
Circuit cited the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Morales v. Jones, where the Seventh Circuit found
a public employee’s subpoenaed deposition testimony about speech was made pursuant to his
official duties and protected by the First Amendment.551 The Eleventh Circuit also cited the
Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, were the court ruled, “a police officer’s
545
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trial testimony was protected by the First Amendment because, although the testimony stemmed
from the officer’s official duties, the officer had an independent obligation as a citizen to testify
truthfully.”552 Thereafter, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal from Lane.

2014

In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court noted the review was being conducted, “to
resolve discord among the Courts of Appeals as to whether public employees may be fired—or
suffer other adverse employment consequences—for providing truthful testimony outside the
course of their ordinary job responsibilities.”553 In Lane, the question before the Court was,
“whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who provides truthful sworn
testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities.”554 The
Court examined Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’s trials. The Court held, “Truthful testimony under
oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for
First Amendment purposes… even when the testimony relates to his public employment or
concerns information learned during that employment.”555 The Court went on to clarify, “Sworn
testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of speech as a citizen for a simple
reason: Anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell

552

Id. See also Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2378 (2014).
554
Id.
555
Id. at 2379.
553

113

the truth.”556 The Court noted public employees have an “obligation as a citizen to speak the
truth.”557
In examining the Lane decision, the Court concluded the appeals court “read Garcetti too
broadly.”558 In clarifying their earlier decision, the Supreme Court stated, “Garcetti said nothing
about speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the
course of public employment.”559 In Lane, the Eleventh Circuit had reasoned Lane’s testimony
was employee speech because the subject matter of his testimony was learned in the course of his
employment.560 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning. The Court
stated, “The mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his
public employment does not transform that speech into employee--rather than citizen-speech.”561 The Court clarified that the “critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at
issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns
those duties.”562 To support this conclusion, the Court cited its previous decisions in public
employee speech cases stating “precedents dating back to Pickering have recognized that speech
by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special value precisely
because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their
employment.”563 The Court also pointed out public employee speech is “especially evident in
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the context” of Lane because the case dealt with public corruption.564 The Court reasoned if the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was allowed to stand, “Such a rule would place public employees
who witness corruption in an impossible position, torn between the obligation to testify truthfully
and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their jobs.”565 For these reasons, the Court ruled
Lane’s sworn testimony was citizen speech and therefore protected under the First Amendment.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas alluded to a possible distinction between
employees who testify as citizens and employees who testify for employers as employees.
Thomas reasoned, “For some employees—such as police officers, crime scene technicians, and
laboratory analysts—testifying is a routine and critical part of their employment duties.”566 He
also pointed out, “Others may be called to testify in the context of particular litigation as the
designated representatives of their employers.”567 Stopping short of making a judgment as to
whether this distinction was valid, Thomas stated, “the Court properly leaves the constitutional
questions raised by these scenarios for another day.”568
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CHAPTER THREE
ANALYSIS OF DATA

This study analyzed public employee First Amendment speech cases decided by the
Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeal in an effort to identify decisional trends,
specific language employed by the courts and methodological approaches utilized by the courts
in formulating opinions. It is anticipated this exploration will assist public school administrators
in better understanding the complex legal issues surrounding public employee First Amendment
speech rights and the conflicting decisions of the lower federal courts in First Amendment
speech cases. This study was also crafted to provide school leaders a basis for developing a
framework for addressing employee speech issues within the public school setting.

Decisional Trends

In 1968, Pickering v. Board of Educ. rejected Justice Holmes’ view of public
employment as privilege thereby expanding the previously denied free speech rights for public
employees.569 Prior to Pickering, public employers had the ability to place conditions on the
terms of public employment absent constitutional constraints.570 In Pickering the Court, “made
clear that government employees do not give up their First Amendment freedom of speech by
569
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virtue of their status as public employees.”571 Pickering created a judicial test to be used in
striking a, “balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”572 From 1968 to 1983,
public employees enjoyed enlarged free speech rights than had existed prior to Pickering.”573
However, since 1983 the High Court’s decisions have resulted in a retrenchment of those rights
by creating a dual threshold requirement in Connick v. Meyers and Garcetti v. Ceballos. As
explained below, this dual threshold requirement has made it more difficult for public employees
to prevail in free speech cases.574

The Dual Threshold Inquiry

In Connick v. Meyers, the Supreme Court modified the Pickering balancing test by
requiring courts to first determine as a threshold requirement whether an employee’s speech
addresses a matter of public concern before applying the Pickering balancing test.575 This test
was commonly referred to as the Pickering/Connick balancing test. In Connick the court stated,
“When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First
571
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Amendment.”576 In Connick, the Court narrowed the definition of “matters of public concern”
by eliminating the need for courts to consider matters related to internal office procedures or
policies that arguably can be considered of public interest. However, Justice Brennan’s dissent
noted, “in concluding that the effect of [government’s] personnel policies on employee morale
and the work performance of the [government office] is not a matter of public concern, the Court
impermissibly narrows the class of subjects on which public employees may speak out without
fear of retaliatory dismissal.”577 By establishing the public concern threshold and narrowing the
definition of matters of public concern, the Court created greater opportunity for public
employers to prevail in public employee free speech cases.
In Connick, the Court further concluded speech of “limited First Amendment interest”
did not require government employers to “tolerate action which [the government employer]
believed would disrupt the office, undermine [its] authority, and destroy close working
relationships.”578 The Connick majority explicitly stated public employers do not have to
establish an employee’s speech actually resulted in disruption of the government’s operations
before taking an adverse employment action against the employee. The Court held, “we do not
see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the
office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”579 Prior to
Connick, if the employer failed to show the employee’s speech disrupted the workings of
government, the speech would be protected.580 After Connick, public employers simply needed
576
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to establish they legitimately believed an employee’s speech would result in disruption before
taking action. In Connick, the Court expanded the rights of public employers, “by withdrawing
protection from all [employee] speech not deemed of public concern,” and allowing employers to
take action against public employees not only for speech actually resulted in disruption but
speech the employer merely believed could result in disruption.
In 2006, the Court modified the Pickering/Connick balancing test by establishing a new
threshold inquiry for courts in deciding public employee speech cases. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,
the Court stated, “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”581 The Court further concluded,
“restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities
does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”582 Prior to
Garcetti, courts first applied Connick’s public interest inquiry to determine if the public
employee’s speech touched on a matter of public concern before applying Pickering’s balancing
test. If the speech in question was found not to touch upon a matter of public concern,
application of the Pickering balancing test was unnecessary. As a result of Garcetti, courts had
to first determine if a public employee spoke as a private citizen or as a public employee
pursuant to their official duties. For almost forty years, courts had paid little attention to whether
the employee spoke as a citizen.583 Under the Garcetti analysis, if a court finds a public
employee spoke not as a private citizen but as a public employee pursuant to their official duties,
the employee’s speech is not entitled to First Amendment protections. As a result, the Court
581
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established a bright line rule, something it had explicitly refused to do in prior public employee
speech cases. Thus Garcetti, “shaped the law such that an employee speaking within the scope of
his employ on matters of public concern is, per se, not speaking as a citizen” and thus not
protected by the First Amendment.584

Impact of the Dual Threshold Inquiry

Each federal Circuit Court of Appeals has developed its own public employee free speech
jurisprudence in response to the dual threshold requirement of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti
test and the test’s vague language contained therein. An analysis of the federal Circuit Courts of
Appeal cases discussed in Chapter Two demonstrates the difficulty public employees face
prevailing in free speech cases at the federal appellate level. Of the twenty five public employee
speech cases discussed in Chapter Two, the courts found in twenty of those cases the public
employee failed to meet Garcetti’s threshold inquiry. Of the five cases where public employees
met the Garcetti’s threshold, only portions of their speech was deemed protected. In Jackler v.
Byrne, the Second Circuit found the entirety of the public employee’s speech was protected.
That Jackler decision, however, has been roundly criticized by the other federal circuit courts.585
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals went so far as to say the Jackler test was “as useful as a
mosquito net made of chicken wire.”586 As a result of the Court’s failure to clearly define the
phrase “pursuant to their official duties,” the ability of a public employee to prevail in a free
584
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speech case at the federal appellate level is contingent upon each Circuit Court’s interpretation of
the vague language of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test.

Table 1 - Garcetti Threshold
Year
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2011
2012
2012

Circuit
7
8
11
1
3
3
6
6
7
11
10
10
10
7
9
2
6
2
D.C.
2
2

Case
Mills v. City of Evansville
McGee v. Pub. Water Supply
Battle v. Bd. of Regents
Curran v. Cousins
Foraker v. Chaffinch
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.
Haynes v. City of Circleville
Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District
Rose v. Kliment
D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd.
Khan v. Rundle
Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twins Peaks Charter Academy
Davis v. Cook County
Freitag v. Ayers
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.
Fox v. Traverse City Sch. Bd.
Jackler v. Byrne
Bowie v. Maddox
Massaro v. Dep't of Educ. Of N.Y.
Ross v. Reslin

Garcetti
Threshold
Failed
Failed
Failed
In part
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
Failed
In part
In part
Failed
In part
Failed
Failed
Passed
Failed
Failed
Failed

Table 1 illustrates the difficulty with which public employees have in meeting Garcetti’s
threshold inquiry.
As illustrated in Table 2 below, in four of the five cases where the Garcetti threshold was
met, the courts found the speech in question also met Connick’s public interest inquiry and thus
satisfied the dual threshold requirement.

121

Table 2 - Connick Threshold

Year
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2011
2012
2012

Circuit
7
8
11
1
3
3
6
6
7
11
10
10
10
7
9
2
6
2
D.C.
2
2

Case
Mills v. City of Evansville
McGee v. Pub. Water Supply
Battle v. Bd. of Regents
Curran v. Cousins
Foraker v. Chaffinch
Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.
Haynes v. City of Circleville
Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District
Rose v. Kliment
D'Angelo v. Sch. Bd.
Khan v. Rundle
Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist.
Brammer-Hoelter v. Twins Peaks Charter Academy
Davis v. Cook County
Freitag v. Ayers
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ.
Fox v. Traverse City Sch. Bd.
Jackler v. Byrne
Bowie v. Maddox
Massaro v. Dep't of Educ. Of N.Y.
Ross v. Reslin

Connick
Threshold
N/A
N/A
N/A
Passed
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Remanded
Passed
N/A
Passed
N/A
N/A
Passed
N/A
N/A
N/A

In only four of the twenty-one cases discussed in Chapter Two did the public employee
meet the dual threshold requirement of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test. Eighty-one percent
of the time, the public employer successfully demonstrated the public employee either spoke
pursuant to their official duties or the public employee didn’t speak on a matter of public
concern.
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Language Employed by the Supreme Court

Pickering, Connick and Garcetti combined to establish the current legal test used by the
courts in deciding public employee speech cases. However, the tests contains vague language
lower courts must interpret in rendering their decisions. As a result, different courts examining
similar fact patters often craft contradictory decisions based on their individual interpretation of
the test’s language. The vague language contained in the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test has
resulted in the federal appellate courts developing their own methodological approaches to
deciding public employee speech cases.
In Pickering, the Court created the balancing test to determine whether the interests of the
public employee in exercising freedom of speech on matters of public concern outweighed the
interest of the employer in maintaining the efficient provision of public services. The Court’s
intent was to provide a broad framework for deciding cases in which public employees claimed
infringement of their free speech rights. In writing for the Court, Justice Marshall
acknowledged, “because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or
feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be
judged.”587 Because the Court expressly refused to “lay down a general standard,” lower courts
were left to consider a number of factors suggested by the Court in Pickering including, the
proximity of the relationship between the employee and the employer; the extent to which the
employer had been harmed or was unable to continue to carry out its function and; the degree to
587
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which the ideas expressed by a public employee constituted a matter of public concern. In its
decision, the Court did not provide guidance on the weight to be accorded each of these factors
but instead left the door open to the possibility the lower court’s might examine additional
factors not expressly mentioned in Pickering.
In Connick, the Court introduced the public concern threshold placing an emphasis on
Pickering’s vague phrase “matters of public concern.” The Pickering Court described a
teacher’s speech critical of his employer’s management of public funds as “a matter of public
concern,” an “issue of general public interest” and an issue “currently the subject of public
attention.”588 The Court failed, however, to clearly define these general phrases. The Court
attempted to provide clarification in Connick by defining, “‘public concern’ as ‘any matter of
political, social or other concern to the community’ in light of ‘the content, form, and context of
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.’”589 However, this attempt at clarification
resulted in additional confusion among the lower courts and the development of their own
“public concern” jurisprudence.590
In Garcetti, the Court continued to the muddy the waters for lower courts tasked with
interpreting and applying the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test. The Garcetti Court held, “when
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes.”591 The Court failed, however, to define what
constituted “pursuant to their official duties.” In Garcetti, “while the majority… made clear that
a government employee acting within the scope of his employ is not acting ‘as a citizen,’ the
588
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majority failed to define the framework for determining what constitutes ‘scope of
employment.’”592 The Court’s failure to clearly articulate what constitutes “pursuant to their
official duties” has led to much confusion among the lower courts leaving each to develop their
own “pursuant to their official duties” jurisprudence.

Methodological Approaches

Post Garcetti, the federal appellate courts have been left to decide what constitutes
speech pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.593 As a result, the courts have relied upon
a variety of factors for determining if an employee’s speech is made pursuant to their official
duties.594 These factors are not mutually exclusive and are at times considered in tandem by
courts in determining whether the employee speech is protected. This section identifies and
discusses four main factors recurrent in the cases discussed in Chapter Two – context; audience;
citizen analogue and; informal job duties.

Context

Context is one main factor the federal appellate courts have considered when deciding
public employee free speech cases. The courts routinely have examined the time, place and
manner in which public employee statements were made to determine whether or not the
592
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employee was speaking pursuant to their official duties. In Mills v. City of Evansville, the
Seventh Circuit relied upon context in ruling a police sergeant spoke pursuant to her official
duties because at the time the sergeant made her comments she was on duty, in her police
uniform and speaking to her superiors within the police department.595 The First Circuit
similarly found in Curran v. Cousins a police officer’s statements were not protected by the First
Amendment because the officer made threatening comments to his superiors on the job during a
discussion of “official Department policy.”596 The Sixth Circuit relied upon context when
considering two cases, Hayes v. City of Circleville and Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District.597 In
Hayes, the court examined the manner in which a police officer wrote a memo to his superiors
regarding the department’s recent cutbacks to the canine program.598 Because the officer was the
author of the program’s standard operating procedures and considered the de facto administrator
of the program, the court concluded the manner in which the officer wrote the memo confirmed
the officer was acting pursuant to his official duties as the de facto administrator in complaining
about the cutbacks to the canine program rather than a private citizen concerned about public
safety.599 In Weisbarth, the Sixth Circuit again examined the context in which a public
employee’s comments were made.600 In this case, the court found comments made by a park
ranger to a paid consultant hired to examine department morale and performance problems were
made by the ranger during her work shift while riding in her work vehicle and were therefore
made pursuant to her official duties. In Fox v. Traverse City Sch. Bd. the Sixth Circuit reiterated,
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“in reviewing a public employee’s statements under Garcetti, [courts] must consider both [the
speech’s] content and context” to determine if it is protected under the First Amendment.601
In D’Angelo v. Sch. Bd., the Eleventh Circuit ruled a principal’s speech regarding the
possibility of converting his public school to a charter school was unprotected speech due to the
context in which the statements were made.602 Examining the Florida statute controlling the
charter conversion process, the court observed applications for charter conversation had to be
made by specific groups enumerated in the law - the district school board, the principal, teachers,
parents, and/or the school advisory council.603 Since the principal was not acting as a board or
school advisory council member, teacher, or parent, the court concluded the manner in which the
principal made his comments must have been pursuant to his official duties as the school
principal. In these five cases, the context of the employee’s speech was a major controlling
factor in the courts’ decisions.

Audience

Many of the federal appellate courts have also considered to whom a public employee
made statements in determining whether the speech merited constitutional protection. If an
employee made comments “up the chain of command” to superiors within their respective
agencies, the courts have routinely found such speech unprotected by the First Amendment. In
Foraker v. Chaffinch, the Third Circuit concluded two Delaware State Troopers’ concerns
regarding the safety and operation of a department firing range were unprotected because the
601
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troopers “were expected, pursuant to their job duties, to report problems concerning the
operations at the range up the chain of command.”604 Because the troopers reported their
concerns to their superiors, their speech was deemed unprotected. In Weintraub v. Bd. Of Educ.,
the Second Circuit ruled a teacher’s complaints regarding how he was treated by his superiors
was unprotected because the teacher complained to his employer, the Board of Education.605 In
Weintraub, the court ruled when an employee expresses complaints and concerns to supervisors,
“up the chain of command of command at his workplace,” the employee’s speech is unprotected
by the First Amendment because it is made pursuant to the employee’s official duties.606 In Ross
v. Breslin, the Second Circuit relied on its previous Wintraub decision in ruling a payroll clerk’s
reporting of alleged improprieties at the school district were unprotected by the First
Amendment.607 The district court had previously ruled in favor of the clerk finding she had gone
outside the chain of command to report the improprieties to the Board of Education when she felt
the school district’s superintendent was not responding appropriately to her allegations.
Reversing the district court’s finding, the Second Circuit ruled, “taking a complaint up the chain
of command to find someone who will take it seriously ‘does not, without more, transform [her]
speech into protected speech made as a private citizen.’”608
In Freitag v. Ayers, the Ninth Circuit expressly distinguished the difference between
concerns raised up the chain of command to superiors within a government agency from
concerns raised by the same employee regarding the same subject matter to someone outside the
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agency.609 In Freitag, the Ninth Circuit ruled a prison guards internal memos regarding inmate
sexual misconduct were unprotected by the First Amendment because they were made to her
superiors within the prison system. However, the same concerns raised by the prison guard to a
state senator outside the prison system were protected.
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the importance of audience in Fox v. Traverse City Sch.
Bd.610 In Fox, the Sixth Circuit ruled a special education teacher’s complaints about class size
were unprotected by the First Amendment because in part the comments were made up the chain
of command to her supervisor. In its decision, the court pointed out the need to consider “to
whom the statement was made” in determining whether speech is protected.611 The court found
the teacher’s comments “were directed solely to her supervisor, not to the general public.”612
Consideration of this factor, in part, led the court to find the speech unprotected by the First
Amendment.
Citizen Analogue

Garcetti stated, “When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment
responsibilities… there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees.”613 Some of the federal appellate courts, particularly the Second Circuit, have
analyzed case fact patterns to see if a relevant citizen analogue existed. In doing so, these courts
have considered whether a public employee expressed themselves in a manner available to
private citizens. The Second Circuit laid out its citizen analogue analysis in Weintraub v. Bd. of
609
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Educ.614 As discussed above, in Weintraub a teacher complained about his treatment to his
supervisors up the chain of command. The teacher’s initial complaint was in the form of a union
grievance. In its decision, the Second Circuit ruled, “the lodging of a union grievance is not a
form or channel of discourse available to non-employee citizens.”615 Because private citizens
lack access to the formal grievance process afforded the teacher, the Second Circuit ruled no
citizen analogue existed and the teacher was speaking as a public employee rather than a private
citizen. Relying on its previous Weintraub decision, the Second Circuit in Massaro v. Dep’t of
Educ. of N.Y. ruled a teacher’s complaints regarding classroom conditions and other job related
concerns were unprotected by the First Amendment in the absence of a relevant citizen
analogue.616 In Massaro, the Second Circuit found the teacher “spoke as an employee rather
than a private citizen… [because] she aired her complaints only to several school administrators
rather than to the public, and most of those complaints were made in the context of internal
safety and medical absence-related forms (as least one of which was marked “confidential”), for
which there was no relevant citizen analogue.617 Again relying on its citizen analogue analysis,
in Jackler v. Byrne the Second Circuit found a police officer’s refusal to obey his superiors
insistence he change a written report regarding another officer’s alleged misconduct was
protected by the First Amendment even though the officer was speaking pursuant to his official
duties.618 In its decision the court ruled, “a citizen has a First Amendment right to decide what to
say and what not to say, and, accordingly, the right to reject governmental efforts to require him
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to make statements he believes are false.”619 The court further concluded, “[the officer’s] refusal
to comply with orders to retract his truthful Report and file one that was false was a clear civilian
analogue and that [the officer] was not simply doing his job in refusing to obey those orders.”620

Informal Job Duties

In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held, “Formal job descriptions often bear little
resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given
task in an employee’s written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate
that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First
Amendment purposes.”621 Many of the federal appellate courts have formulated decisions based
on duties an employee can reasonably be expected to perform even if those duties are not
expressly written in formal job descriptions. In McGee v. Pub. Water Supply, a supervisor at a
water treatment plant argued his criticism of repairs being made at the plant were protected by
the First Amendment because he had been removed from supervising the repair projects and was
told not to concern himself with the repairs.622 The Eight Circuit rejected his argument ruling his
general supervisory duties included repairs at the plant and his duty to advise the Water Supply
Board regarding regulatory and legal requirements.623 The court concluded the supervisor’s
comments were related to duties the supervisor would, “actually be expected to perform.”624 In
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Foraker v. Chaffinch, two Delaware State Troopers argued statements they made regarding
safety concerns at a department firing range were protected by the First Amendment because
their formal job duties entailed instructing students on how to fire weapons and not speaking out
about health and safety concerns at the firing range.625 The Third Circuit disagreed ruling it was
within the troopers’ job functions to report problems at the firing range to their supervisors even
if such a duty to report was not expressly written in their formal job descriptions. In Williams v.
Indep. Sch. Dist., a high school athletic director argued concerns he raised over an athletic
department account were protected speech because he was not required to raise such concerns as
athletic director.626 The school board conceded it was not within the athletic directors formal
responsibilities. The Fifth Circuit ruled the concerns raised by the athletic director pertained to
his “daily operations” as athletic director and the athletic account in question was necessary for
the operation of the athletic department.627 Therefore the court reasoned the comments regarding
the athletic account were made pursuant to the athletic director’s official duties even though the
school board conceded it was not within the athletic director’s formal job responsibilities to raise
such concerns.
The Seventh Circuit has ruled a public employee’s “more general responsibilities” must
be considered when determining whether or not a public employee’s speech was made pursuant
to his official duties.628 In Vose v. Kliment, a police department’s narcotics unit supervisor
argued concerns he raised about misconduct of officers in the department’s major case unit were
protected by the First Amendment because conducting an independent investigation of the major
625
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crime unit and reporting suspected misconduct was not within his formal job responsibilities.
The narcotics supervisor believed detectives in the major case unit were using alleged drug
investigations to obtain search warrants contrary to department procedures and the law. The
Seventh Circuit stated, “A public employee’s more general responsibilities are not beyond the
scope of the official duties for First Amendment purposes.”629 The court reasoned after Garcetti,
“th[e] focus on ‘core’ job functions [was] to narrow.”630 The court ruled, “while [the supervisor]
may have gone above his ordinary daily job duties in reporting the suspected misconduct outside
his unit, it was not beyond his official duty as a sergeant of the narcotics unit to ensure the
security and propriety of the narcotics unit’s operations.”631 Because the supervisor’s reporting
of alleged misconduct fell within his “more general responsibilities” as defined by the Seventh
Circuit, the panel concluded the supervisor’s speech was not protected by the First
Amendment.632
The Eleventh Circuit has defined informal job duties as those that “owe their existence”
to a person’s employment as a government agent. In Khan v. Rundle, an assistant state’s
attorney argued comments he made in court were protected by the First Amendment because he
refused to follow the directives issued by his supervisors lie to judges.633 The assistant state’s
attorney pointed out the supervisory expectation for him to lie in court was part of his official
duties. Therefore, when he testified truthfully he was speaking as a citizen and not as a
government employee. The Eleventh Circuit ruled the assistant state’s attorney’s statements in
court owed their existence to his role as a government lawyer while representing the state of
629
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Florida in open court.634 The Eleventh Circuit expanded on its definition of duties owing their
existence to an employee’s role as a government agent in Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks
Charter Academy.635 In Brammer-Hoelter, the court reasoned, “if an employee engages in
speech during the course of performing an official duty and the speech reasonably contributes to
or facilitates the employee’s performance of the official duty, the speech is made pursuant to the
employee’s official duties.”636 The court stated, “speech may be made pursuant to an
employee’s official duties even if it deals with activities that the employee is not expressly
required to perform.”637 Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings in Khan and Brammer-Hoelter,
the Sixth Circuit has also stated comments owing their existence to a person’s government
employment are unprotected by the First Amendment. In Fox v. Traverse City Sch. Bd., the
Sixth Circuit stated, “speech by a public employee made pursuant to ad hoc or de facto duties not
appearing in any written job description is nevertheless not protected if it ‘owes its existence to
[the speaker’s] professional responsibilities.’”638

Lane v. Franks – A Potential Turning Point

Post Garcetti, the federal appellate courts have been left to decide what constitutes
speech pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.639 But are the federal appellate courts’
interpretations of what constitutes speech pursuant to a public employee’s official duties too
634
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expansive thereby unduly restricting public employee speech rights? The Supreme Court’s
recent Lane v. Franks decision may help to answer that question and possibly portend a reversal
in the restrictive trend in public employee speech rights discussed above.640
In Lane, the director of a community college program, Edward Lane, sued his former
employer alleging his First Amendment rights were violated when he was fired after
investigating potential fraud in the program involving a state legislator and subsequently
testifying as a subpoenaed witness in two prosecutions initiated against the state legislator.641
The question before the Court was, “whether the First Amendment protects a public employee
who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his
ordinary job responsibilities.”642 The Eleventh Circuit ruled it was not protected speech. The
appellate panel, relying on its previously established “pursuant to official duties” jurisprudence
reasoned, “Lane testified about his official activities pursuant to a subpoena and in the litigation
context, in and of itself, [did] not bring Lane’s speech within the protection of the First
Amendment.”643 The court ruled, “Nothing evidences that Lane testified at [the state
representative’s] trial ‘primarily in [his] role as citizen’ or that his testimony was an attempt to
comment publicly on CITY’s internal operations.”644 The Supreme Court, however, concluded
the Eleventh Circuit had, “read Garcetti far too broadly” and pointed out, “Garcetti said nothing
about speech that simply relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the
course of public employment.”645 Further clarifying its Garcetti decision, the Court stated, “the
640
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mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public
employment does not transform that speech into employee – rather than citizen – speech.”646
The Court concluded, “The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself
ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”647
The High Court’s Lane decision may have signaled a reversal in the restrictive trend in
public employee speech rights by cautioning the federal appellate courts their interpretations of
what constitutes speech pursuant to an employee’s official duties may be too broad. Although
Lane dealt specifically with truthful sworn subpoenaed testimony, this may be the first case in a
string of new Supreme Court cases that attempt to clarify Garcetti’s vague language and,
“resolve discord among the Courts of Appeals” in deciding public employee speech cases.648
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

For young teachers, social media websites such as Facebook are part of their daily lives.
They grew up posting messages, “liking” other people’s comments and sharing personal
information with people they’ve “friended.” For many of these young teachers, social media
may be their primary vehicle for communicating with family, friends, colleagues and
acquaintances. According to the National Education Association (NEA), some young teachers
“seem oblivious to the devastating consequences of posting really stupid things in
cyberspace.”649 As a result school administrators find themselves dealing with a growing
number of concerns over teacher cyber speech. As young teachers continue to incorporate social
media into every aspect of their lives, it is important for school administrators to understand how
to deal with the inevitable situation involving a school community member reporting alleged
inappropriate comments made by a teacher via a social media or another type of Internet website.

Pickering/Connick/Garcetti Test

The appropriate legal test to apply to teacher cyber speech cases is the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test. Since the Supreme Court’s 2006 Garcetti decision, the courts
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have consistently applied this test to public employee speech cases.650 It’s likely the vast
majority of school administrators has never heard of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test nor
confronted a teacher cyber speech issue. School administrators are more likely to have faced
cyber speech issues with students. Most school administrators have probably heard of the Tinker
test routinely applied to student speech cases and most probably understand Tinker’s material
and substantial disruption requirements.651 However, without knowledge of the
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test, school administrators may rely on their understanding of Tinker
to address a complaint or concern regarding a teacher’s cyber speech. As the probability school
administrators will have to address employee cyber speech issues rises, it is important school
administrators be aware of the correct legal test employed by courts in public employee speech
cases so they can properly investigate and appropriately react to teacher cyber speech issues.

Investigating Teacher Cyber Speech

The legal issues surrounding public employee speech are complex as demonstrated by the
divergent public employee speech jurisprudence among the federal appellate courts. The
Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test can provide school administrators with guidance on what
questions to ask and what information to collect during employee cyber speech investigations.
According to the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test, the first question a school administrator should
ask in response to a complaint regarding a teacher’s cyber speech is: Was the teacher speaking as
650
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a private citizen or as a public employee pursuant to their official duties? Contrary to first blush
appearance, this is not an easy question to answer. However, the federal appellate courts have
provided a number of factors for school administrators should consider when attempting to
answer this question.

Context

The first factor school administrators should consider is context. They should pay
particular attention to the time, place and manner in which the teacher made the comments. The
school administrator needs to know whether or not the teacher made the comments during work
hours within the school building utilizing district owned technology. The school administrator
also needs to how the speech was communicated. The school administrator should consider
whether the comments were posted to a private social media account, like Facebook, or a more
public online venue such as a public discussion blog. If the school administrator finds the
teacher made the comments while on duty using district-owned technology, it is more likely the
courts will find the teacher acted pursuant to her official duties. The teacher also most likely
violated the school board’s policy governing appropriate use of district-owned technology
equipment. If the teacher made the comments after hours using a privately owned personal
technology device, the school administrator should consider additional factors in determining
whether the teacher spoke pursuant to her official duties.
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Audience

The school administrator also needs to identify to whom the teacher made the allegedly
inappropriate comments. Because the comments were made by the teacher online, this may also
be a difficult question to answer. The school administrator should determine whether the
comments were expressly directed to a specific person or group, such as a parent, student or
colleague or at a specific entity, such as the school district or the school board. If the teacher’s
comments were directed at either school administrators or the board of education, the courts may
find the comments were made up the chain of command within the school district. The federal
appellate courts have routinely ruled comments made up the chain of command were unprotected
by the First Amendment. If the teacher’s comments were not directed to a specific individual or
entity, the school administrator should attempt to determine who had the ability to view the
teacher’s comments. If the comments were made on a teacher’s personal social media webpage,
it would be helpful to determine the webpage’s privacy settings. Determining who had the
ability to view the teacher’s comments may be helpful in establishing the intended audience.

Citizen Analogue

The school administrator should analyze whether the teacher’s expression was accessible
to a private citizen. School administrators should determine whether a private citizen had the
ability to post comments on the same webpage utilized by the teacher. If the general public has
the ability to post comments to the same webpage the teacher used in making the allegedly
inappropriate comments, it’s possible the courts will find a citizen analogue existed. Where a
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citizen analogue exists, the courts are more likely to rule the public employee was not speaking
pursuant to their official duties because private citizens can avail themselves to the same method
of communication as the public employee used.

Informal Job Duties

Garcetti stated, “Formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to the duties an
employee actually is expected to perform, and the listing of a given task in an employee’s written
job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is
within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First Amendment purposes.”652 In
analyzing the teacher’s comments, school administrators should determine if the teacher’s
comments could be reasonably linked to the job they were expected to perform. For example, if
a general education teacher made comments online critical of individual education plans for
special education students assigned to her classroom, the courts may find the teacher made
comments pursuant to her official duties because a school district may reasonably expect a
teacher to bring those concerns to school officials even if a duty to report isn’t expressly listed in
the teacher’s job description. The Seventh Circuit has stated, “A public employee’s more
general responsibilities are not beyond the scope of the official duties for First Amendment
purposes.”653 The Sixth Circuit has ruled comments owing their existence to a person’s
government employment are unprotected by the First Amendment.654 If the school administrator
can link the teacher’s comments to the teacher’s general responsibilities or establish the teacher’s
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comments owed their existence to the teacher’s employment with the school district, the courts
may find the teacher spoke pursuant to her official duties when making the allegedly
inappropriate comments online.

Speech As A Matter of Public Concern

If a school administrator can establish the teacher’s allegedly inappropriate online
comments were made pursuant to the teacher’s official duties, they can move to the
second part of the balancing test to determine if the comments addressed a matter of
public concern. In Connick the court stated, “When employee expression cannot be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices,
without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”655 If
the teacher’s comments were related to internal school procedures or policies, courts will
most likely find the teacher’s comments were not on a matter of public concern and thus
not protected by the First Amendment. Frequent media coverage regarding inappropriate
teacher comments posted online discusses teacher rants aimed at students and their
parents. Analyzing the federal appellate case law, courts will most likely consider these
rants merely inappropriate comments made by a disgruntled employee and not speech on
a matter of public concern. In 2011, a first grade teacher was fired for posting, “I’m a
warden for future criminals!” The firing was upheld by an administrative law judge who
stated, “the district’s need to operate efficiently trumped any free speech rights because
655
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‘thoughtless words can destroy the partnership between home and school that is essential
to the mission of the schools.’”656 General comments regarding public education, major
education initiatives and the state of parenting, however, may be deemed of interest to the
general public and thus most likely protected by the First Amendment. School
administrators must carefully consider the content of the online comments and their
appeal to the general public before taking action against the teacher – even if the
comments are controversial. The Supreme Court has recognized government employees
have specific knowledge of the workings of their government agencies and can heighten
public discourse on important matters of public concern. The Court has held “free and
open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate,” and, “teachers are, as
a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions”
regarding school matters and should be “able to speak out freely on such questions
without fear of retaliatory dismissal.”657 Thus, school administrators should tread
carefully when considering if the teacher’s comments were on a matter of public concern
and protected by the First Amendment.
School administrators don’t have to wait for an actual disruption of school
operations before taking action. The Connick Court stated, “we do not see the necessity
for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office
and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”658 School
administrators simply need to establish they legitimately believed a teacher’s online
comments would result in disruption before taking action. If school administrators can
656
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argue the teacher’s online comments were not related to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, they can take action against the teacher without having
to wait until an actual disruption of the school environment occurs.

Interests of the Teacher vs. Interests of the School District

If school administrators can establish the teacher’s alleged controversial
comments were made pursuant to their official duties and on a matter of public concern,
the final part of the Pickering/Connick/Garcetti test requires school administrators to
weight the teacher’s interest in exercising their freedom of speech against the school
official’s interest in maintaining the efficient provision of public educational services. In
balancing the teacher’s interests against the school district’s interests, school
administrators need to consider several factors outlined by the Supreme Court in
Pickering. First, school administrators should consider whether the teacher’s comments
jeopardized her relationships with her immediate supervisors or harmony with coworkers. Comments directed at parents may not result in discord between the teacher and
her supervisors and coworkers whereas comments about a teaching colleague or the
school principal may lead to discord. Second, the school administrator should determine
if the comments would impede the teacher from performing her teaching duties. Rants
toward students are more likely to impede the teacher’s ability to perform her job
functions in contrast to comments directed at a new instructional initiative. Lastly,
school administrators need to consider whether the teacher’s comments have or will
cause disruption to the efficient operation of the school. Inappropriate comments that

144

create a public uproar and distract the school from focusing on the mission of educating
public school children can and most likely will negatively impact the efficient operation
of the school. If the teacher’s comments negatively impact her working relationships,
impede her ability to discharge her duties as a teacher and/or negatively impact the
efficient operation of the schools, the courts will most likely tip the balance in favor of
school officials and thus afford the teacher’s comments no First Amendment protections.

Involving the Board Attorney

There are many factors school administrators should consider when confronted
with alleged inappropriate online comments by public school teachers. This chapter and
the flow charts below are designed to assist school administrators in investigating
allegations of inappropriate online teacher comments and collecting pertinent information
that may be used to take action against the teacher. However, case law on teacher cyber
speech is continuing to evolve and public employee cyber speech jurisprudence is scant.
Because this is far from a settled area of law, school administrators may use this study to
help guide their investigations but should ultimately turn their findings over to their
school board attorney prior to taking any action against a teacher for their online speech.
School board attorneys will have knowledge of the most recent, if any, public employee
speech cases progressing through the courts and an accompanying understanding of
public employee speech decisions in the school district’s federal appellate court
jurisdiction. Involving the school board attorney will serve school administrators well
when dealing with the thorny legal issues involved in these types of cases.
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Recommendations for Further Study

This study analyzed public employee First Amendment speech cases decided by
the Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeal in an effort to identify decisional
trends, specific language employed by the courts and methodological approaches utilized
by the courts in formulating opinions.
This study focused specifically on Supreme Court and federal appellate court
decisions in cases involving public employee speech rights. Expanding the study to
include lower court decisions and cases brought before administrative law judges or state
labor relations boards may assist in predicting how the courts would deal with specific
fact patterns relating to public employee cyber speech.
Disciplining public school teachers, including termination, can be a lengthy and
costly process for school districts. Many school districts may favor entering into
separation agreements with public school teachers accused of posting inappropriate
comments online. Using freedom of information laws to obtain, if possible, separation
agreements entered into because of cyber speech issues may also shed some light on the
complicated issues surrounding employee cyber speech cases. Additionally, interviewing
school administrators who have dealt with teacher cyber speech issues could provide
valuable information that can be used to further tailor the recommendations on how
school administrators should effectively respond to complaints of inappropriate cyber
speech by teachers.
Lastly, public employee cyber speech is an area of emerging law. As more case
law emerges, it would be helpful to review the specific findings of the court to analyze
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how federal appellate courts and/or the Supreme Court apply current public employee
speech jurisprudence specifically to public employee cyber speech cases.
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Administrative Guide to Cyber Speech Investigations
The intent of this guide is to assist administrators in the collection of pertinent information
during investigations of alleged inappropriate employee cyber speech. In certain circumstances,
employee cyber speech may be protected by the First Amendment. Administrators should use
this guide to collect evidence and work with their school board attorney’s to determine if the
speech is constitutionally protected and what, if any, disciplinary actions can be taken if the
employee cyber speech is found to be inappropriate by the administrator.
Part I- Investigate whether the teacher spoke as a private citizen or public employee
pursuant to their official duties.
1. Consider the context (time, place and manner):
a. Did the speech occur during the workday?
b. Did the teacher use district owned equipment when making the comments?
2. Consider the intended audience:
a. Were the comments expressly directed at a specific person or group (parent,
student, colleague, supervisor, school district, school board)?
b. Who viewed the teacher’s comments?
c. If the teacher was using a private social media account, can you determine the
privacy settings on the account?
3. Consider the comments in relation to the teacher’s formal and informal job duties:
a. Were the comments specifically linked to one or more of the teacher’s official
duties (caseloads, schedule, assigned curriculum, etc.)?
b. Were the comments specifically linked to one or more duties the teacher could
responsibility be expected to perform (general supervision of students,
implementing school district policies or curriculum, maintaining appropriate
professional relationships with colleagues)?
4. Consider whether a citizen analogue existed:
a. Could a private citizen have posted comments to the same webpage the teacher
used in making the allegedly inappropriate comments?
Part II – Investigate whether the speech touched on a matter of public concern.
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1. Did the speech relate to a political, social or other concern the school community would
find of interest?
2. Could the speech be characterized as an emotional rant?
3. Did the comments heighten public discourse about a matter relating to the school or
school district?
4. Did you reasonably believe the comments would lead to a general disruption of the
school environment?
Part III – Investigate the impact the speech had on the general school environment.
1. Did the speech cause an actual disruption to the school environment? If so:
a. Did the speech negatively impact the teacher’s ability to work with colleagues,
parents or immediate supervisor(s)?
b. Did the speech negatively impact the teacher’s ability to deliver classroom
instruction?
c. Did the comments result in general discord within the school or larger school
community?
Part IV – If you found the comments to be inappropriate in your professional opinion,
discuss your findings with the school board attorney before you consider disciplining the
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The visual below illustrates the three essential questions school administrators should ask
themselves when investigating alleged inappropriate teacher cyber speech.

Is the teacher’s cyber
speech protected by
the First Amendment?

Was the teacher speaking
as a private citizen or
pursuant to their official
duties?

Were the teacher’s
comments on a matter of
public concern?

Does the school’s interest
in maintaining its efficient
operation outweigh the
teacher’s interest in
exercising their freedom
of speech?
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The visual below illustrates the factors to be considered when attempting to determine whether a
teacher spoke pursuant to their official duties.

Context – Time,
Place, Manner

Informal Job
Duties

Private Citizen
or Public
Employee?

Audience

Citizen
Analogue
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The visual below illustrates the factors to be considered when attempting to determine whether a
teacher’s comments were on a matter of public concern.

Political issue
of interest to the
community

Did Speech
Address a
Matter of
Public
Concern?
Other issues of
which the
community may
have concerns

Social issue of
interest to the
community
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The visual below illustrates the factors to be considered when balancing the interests of the
teacher to freely express them self and the interests of the school in maintaining efficient
operations.

Comments
jeopardized
working
relationships

Disrupted or
has the
potential to
disrupt school
operations

Does the
Teacher’s
Interests
Outweigh
Schools?
District’s

Impede the
ability of the
teacher to
perform duties

